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COMMENTS
NEW YORK'S POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIPS: A VICTORY SUGGESTIVE
OF FUTURE CHANGE
John 0. Enright*
INTRODUCTION

Larry Courtney lost in the World Trade Center attacks the partner
with whom he had lived and shared his life for more than thirteen
Like any individual losing a partner, Mr. Courtney
years.'
immediately was forced to confront not only the emotional impact but
also the financial reality of supporting himself without a partner's
help. In the event of tragedies such as the World Trade Center
attacks, however, federal and state governments provide victims'
family members with a certain financial safety net in the event of a
death of a spouse. This safety net includes, among other benefits,
workers' compensation payments when a husband or wife dies on the
job and crime victim awards when a spouse dies as a result of a
criminal act. Unfortunately for Mr. Courtney, he lost not a wife but
his male partner.2 Consequently, his thirteen-year relationship was
invisible under the law and he had no right to the governmental
support available to similarly situated married couples.
Nonetheless, Mr. Courtney made a claim for workers'
compensation benefits from his insurance carrier with the hope that
the carrier would treat him as if he were a husband who had lost his
wife. The insurance carrier, which defers to the New York State
Workers' Compensation Law to determine eligibility,' denied his
claim.' Undeterred, he went on to challenge the New York Workers'
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to
Professor James E. Fleming for all of his help and guidance. I would like to further
thank my parents, John and Rosemary Enright, for their unending support.
1. See Robert F. Worth, Gay Man to Seek Benefits for Loss of Companion on
Sept. 11, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2002, at B7.
2. Id.
3. N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law §§ 1-430 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2004).
4. See Worth, supra note 1.
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Compensation Law on the grounds that it should apply not only to

survivors who lost spouses but to same-sex survivors too.' His claim
and his insurer's refutation subsequently became moot when the New
York State Assembly and Senate unanimously passed an amendment

to the Workers' Compensation Law, making eligible for workers'
compensation benefits the "domestic partners" of victims of
September 11, 2001.6

Mr. Courtney's story is striking not only because of the inequitable
law he initially faced, but more so because of the New York State
legislature's response.
Specifically, the legislature's amendment
marked the first time a "domestic partner" was recognized under New

York State law.7 Stories such as Mr. Courtney's demonstrate how
September 11, 2001 altered the American legal landscape for same-

sex couples. One need only look at legislative and judicial responses

in the fields of tort,8 criminal,9 and workers' compensation law, 1°

among others, to recognize the undeniable impact of the terrorist
attacks on our law. In the aftermath of the attacks, legislation at all
governmental levels, affecting multiple areas of the law, was passed.
Among the most immediate challenges, lawmakers sought to address
the needs of victims' families and, in doing so, were confronted
directly with the realities faced by certain families who were, in many
5. Id.
6. 2002 N.Y. Laws 467 (codified at N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 4 (McKinney
Supp. 2004)). The Empire State Pride Agenda ("ESPA") heralded its passage:
This law along with several other 9/11-related measures that were
unanimously approved this year by the legislature represent the first time
that domestic partners have been recognized in any context whatsoever
under New York State law," said [Joe] Grabarz [Executive Director of the
Empire State Pride Agenda]. "Getting lawmakers to this point has been a
long process of education and grassroots advocacy by the lesbian and gay
community from across the state. We hope this is just a beginning and will be
working with legislators to see that our families and relationships receive
additional support in the future.
Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, New NY State Law Giving Spousal
Benefits to Gay Partners of 9/11 Victims Is a 'Significant Step Forward,' But Gay
Families
Still
Unprotected
in
Tragedies
(Aug.
21,
2002),
at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-8-21-02.html.
Previously, Governor
Pataki had indefinitely suspended the statutorily imposed obligation of providing an
employer notice of the injury or death within thirty days of such injury or death.
Exec. Order No. 113.35, 2001 N.Y. St. Reg., No. XXIII, at 87.
7. 2002 N.Y. Laws 467 (codified at N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 4).
8. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 note, 44302-44306 (Supp. 2001)).
9. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
10. See, e.g., September 11th Victims and Families Relief Act, 2002 N.Y. Laws 73
(codified at N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 29(1-b) (McKinney Supp. 2004), N.Y. Est.
Powers & Trusts Law § 11-4.7(e) (McKinney Supp. 2004), N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act §
205(3) (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 2307(2) (McKinney Supp.
2004)).
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ways, completely invisible under the eyes of law: same-sex couples.
The reality of these families' needs spurred lawmakers to begin to
correct the inequities they faced.
Traditionally, same-sex couples, because of the inability to legally
marry, have been denied most, if not all, of the benefits available to
These benefits, such as automatic spousal
married couples.1
eligibility for health insurance, recognition under intestacy laws, and
the right to assert wrongful death actions, among others, become even
more crucial in the event of tragedy.12 Legislators' actions following
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly in New York,
were noteworthy in that they made the surviving partners of same-sex
couples eligible for substantial federal and state awards, including
workers' compensation payments, crime victim awards and disaster
relief funds, normally available only to spouses and other family
members.13 In sum, this legislation marked a change in the legal
treatment of same-sex couples and, potentially, a more general change
in perception of the problems they face.
These substantial changes have not gone unnoticed. One gay and
lesbian rights organization proclaimed that the new New York laws
constituted the "first time that domestic partners have been
recognized in any context whatsoever under New York State law."14
Another individual claimed that certain federal legislation produced a
change in the "'political climate and it's hard to imagine totally
turning back the clock.""' 5 Similarly, others asserted, "[t]his is the first
time the federal government has recognized a same-sex relationship
this way. '"16 It is clear that a significant turn has been made.
New York State legislation passed in response to September 11,
2001, coupled with advancements at the federal level, marks a
significant change in the treatment of same-sex couples. While there
was some precedent supporting the increased legal protection of
same-sex couples, the stories told by the same-sex survivors of victims
11. See, e.g., Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union:
A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic PartnershipOrdinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
1164, 1167-68 (1992); Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic
PartnersStatute in an Environment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages,7 Law & Sexuality
55, 66-72 (1997).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, supra note 6 (quoting Joe
Grabarz, Executive Director of the Empire State Pride Agenda).
15. Jane Gross, U.S. Fund for Tower Victims Will Aid Some Gay Partners,N.Y.
Times, May 30, 2002, at Al (quoting Lee M. Miringoff, Director of the Marist College
Poll).
16. See Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense Fund, Federal Government
Awards Survivor Benefits to Lesbian Whose Partner Was Killed in 9/11 Attack;
Lambda Legal Says Recognition Is First of Its Kind (Jan. 23, 2003) (quoting Jennifer
Middleton, Lambda Legal Staff Attorney), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=1193.
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exposed the inequities they face. This Comment argues that such
storytelling likely played a role in influencing lawmakers' responses to
September 11, 2001. Further, in light of applicable theories about
legal and social movements, the stories told were persuasive and
can-and should-be used in the future to compel similar lawmaking.
Part I begins by discussing the traditional treatment of same-sex
couples under federal and state law. Part I.B. focuses on the
traditional treatment of same-sex couples in New York State. Part
I.C. discusses the legislation passed in response to September 11, 2001
and how it treated same-sex survivors of victims as if they had lost
married spouses. Part I.D. discusses how commentators debated the
post-September 11, 2001 lawmaking and the stories they used to
advance their arguments. Part II.A. discusses the role of storytelling
in legal scholarship and the important role it has played for advocates
of gay and lesbian rights. In the September 11, 2001 context, the
public, including lawmakers, heard compelling stories from same-sex
survivors about how they are mistreated under the law. Part II.B.
explores the potential long-term effects of the New York State
legislation, and limited federal recognition, using theories developed
to gauge how socio-legal change occurs. The inquiry is aided by
asking how social movements have changed in response to other
tragedies and how subsequent political opportunities furthered their
causes. Part III applies the theories of storytelling and social change
introduced in Part II to argue that emotional events such as
September 11, 2001 can play an important part in persuading
lawmakers to recognize same-sex couples under the law. Part III
further argues that, when compared to analogous social movements
from the past, the unique circumstance of September 11, 2001 raised
awareness of the reality of same-sex couples' lives and the injustices
they faced under existing law, thus leading to legal transformations
that are likely to be sustained and expanded.
I. SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE LEGALLY DISADVANTAGED RELATIVE
TO MARRIED HETEROSEXUAL COUPLES

The number of unmarried, co-habiting couples has risen
dramatically in the United States over the past thirty years.17 This
17. See Yuval Merin, Equality for Same-Sex Couples 190 (2002). The United
States Census Bureau's 2000 census estimates that unmarried couples constitute
about 9% of all "coupled households" and same-sex couples account for about 1% of
all coupled households. See U.S. Census Bureau, Married-Couple and Unmarried
Partner Households: 2000, at 3 (2003) ("A reflection of changing lifestyles is mirrored
in Census 2000's enumeration of 5.5 million couples who were living together but who
were not married, up from 3.2 million in 1990 ....[A]bout 1 in 9 (594,000) had
partners of the same sex."), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr5.pdf. Commentators argued that the figures would help sway public opinion.
Households Headed by Gays Rose in the 90's, Data Shows, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2001,
at A17 ("'The census figures will change the debate for many Americans from an
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increase has occurred concomitantly for both heterosexual couples

who have the ability to marry and same-sex couples who do not. 8

While many married couples might take for granted those rights
afforded to them by virtue of their relationship, the rising number of
unmarried couples-whether by choice or not-are often all too
aware of what privileges they lack. Part I.A. sets forth and analyzes
the rights and benefits attributable to marriage. It then highlights a
few of the rights that become particularly valuable-and necessary-

in the event of the death of a spouse.
A. Legal Rights Attributable to Marriage
Same-sex couples are legally disadvantaged relative to married
couples.19 Marriage-dependent rights that same-sex couples do not
benefit from include: parenting rights;20 rights allowing a partner to

act as a guardian of the other in the event of hospitalization;2 the right
to adopt children;22 prioritization in claiming human remains; 23 the

abstract controversy read about in newspapers or seen in noisy debates on television
to a discussion about real families, real people and real lives."' (quoting David Smith
of the Human Rights Campaign)).
18. See Merin, supra note 17, at 190.
19. See id. at 197-236; David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of
Marriageand the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447
(1996); Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried
Couples Dependent Upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 991, 998-1001 (2000);
Kubasek, supra note 11, at 66-72; Arthur S. Leonard, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Partners Under US State or Local Law, in Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law 133, 134-52
(Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001). One exception is Vermont's Civil
Union law, where same-sex couples entering into civil unions are given the same
rights as married couples. See infra note 93, 137-42 and accompanying text. Even
those same-sex couples who benefit from a domestic partnership registry or ordinance
remain disadvantaged. See infra Part I.B.2.
20. The quest for parenting rights is one of the many battles being fought and, like
all other rights being sought, parenting rights host their own particular complexities
and problems. See, e.g., Ryiah Lilith, Caring for the Ten Percent's 2.4: Lesbian and
Gay Parents' Access to Parental Benefits, 16 Wis. Women's L.J. 125 (2001)
(highlighting the particular problems facing gay and lesbian parents and the
consequent need for substantive legal rights).
21. See Chambers, supra note 19, at 454-55. The most well known example is the
case of Sharon Kowalski. After being critically injured in an automobile accident,
Kowalski's father and female partner, Karen Thompson, both sought to act as
Kowalski's sole guardian. Kowalski's father, who did not recognize his daughter's
relationship, sought to terminate Thompson's guardianship and the Minnesota Court
of Appeals agreed, terminating the guardianship and further terminating any hospital
visitation rights. See In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
22. See generally John G. Culhane, A "Clanging Silence": Same-Sex Couples and
Tort Law, 89 Ky. L.J. 911, 931-36 (2001) (arguing that because sexual relations are not
at issue in same-sex adoption cases, as opposed to same-sex marriage cases, courts are
more willing to extend rights in the former but never in the latter); Timothy E. Lin,
Note, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives
in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 739, 768-69 (1999) (noting that the
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right to help provide citizenship to a non-American partner; 24
government-provided benefits, such as social security and workers'
compensation; 25 employer-provided benefits, such as health insurance

and bereavement leave; 26 benefits in bankruptcy proceedings; 27 tax

benefits; 28 standing for certain tort actions;29 housing rights;" property
rights granted through state-created intestate succession laws;31 and
divorce rights, such as the ability to receive, or the obligation to

provide, spousal support and alimony.3 2 Even a perfunctory look at
these benefits evidences same-sex couples' disadvantages relative to
married heterosexual couples.
The inequity of a committed same-sex couple's lack of marriage-

dependent benefits is amplified in the event of tragedy, when many
rights available to heterosexual widows and widowers become
critically important.33 Three legal rights that are particularly salient in

legal status of same-sex adoption varies by jurisdiction).
23. See Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex
Partners: Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 31, 47 (2002)
(recognizing that the personal representative of a decedent's estate often dictates how
the decedent's remains will be handled).
24. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 11, at 1167.
26. See generally Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex
Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Perfect InstitutionalChoice,
7 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 337 (1998) (discussing the implications and
limitations of market-based domestic partnership benefits).
27. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A
Proposalto Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 69, 103 (1998) (arguing for a revision of the bankruptcy system "to
ensure that it awards benefits based on the economic, rather than the marital,
relationship between two individuals").
28. Id. at 88. For an early analysis of the tax consequences stemming from
employer-granted benefits, see Jarrett Tomis Barrios, Note, Growing Pains in the
Workplace: Tax Consequences of Health Plans for Domestic Partners,47 Tax Law.
845 (1994).
29. See generally Culhane, supra note 22.
30. The Fair Housing Act does not bar discrimination in housing based on sexual
orientation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
31. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 43-44.
32. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the
Law 793 (1997); Kubasek, supra note 11, at 66-67. For an argument in favor of
"divorce" rights for domestic partners, see Jessica A. Hoogs, Note, Divorce Without
Marriage: Establishing a Uniform Dissolution Procedure for Domestic Partners
Through a ComparativeAnalysis of European and American Domestic PartnerLaws,
54 Hastings L.J. 707 (2003) (proposing a uniform "divorce" procedure based on
international sources and Vermont's civil union provisions). Vermont's civil union
law gives the state's family courts the same jurisdiction over the dissolution of civil
unions as it does marriages. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002); see also Greg
Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage,25 Vt. L. Rev. 15,
43 (2000) (noting that "[t]his is a first in America").
33. See Denny Lee, Partnersof Gay Victims Find the Law Calls Them Strangers,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2001, § 14, at 4. It is important to mention that although this
Comment discusses the lack of rights accorded to same-sex couples, and only touches
upon similar effects to unmarried heterosexual couples, the latter group's problems
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the event of a disaster are: (1) the right to a distribution of property

under probate law, (2) delegation of health care and monetary
benefits from public and private sources, and (3) the right to damages
payable under states' wrongful death statutes. In the absence of
legislation providing same-sex couples treatment equal to that of
married couples-and with respect to probate law, the lack of a will

designating a same-sex partner as a beneficiary-same-sex partners
are not considered the "spouse" of a victim and are prevented from
recovering accordingly.34
1. Probate Law
Probate law governs and defines the distribution of a decedent's

assets at death.35 Such distribution is made either (1) in accordance
with a will or (2) in the absence of a will, in accordance with the

applicable state's intestacy laws.36 The latter include statutorily
defined default family members to whom a decedent's property will
be distributed upon death. 37 Most of these statutes are based, at least

in part, on the Uniform Probate Code,38 and with the exception of

Hawaii, 39 Vermont,4" and California, 4 no state includes same-sex,
committed partners as beneficiaries.4 2 From this vantage point, a

are similar in many respects. For an insight into the parallels felt by widowed fiancres
after September 11, 2001, see Shaila K. Dewan, No Dress, No Vows, and Less Status
in Grief,N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2002, at Al.
34. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 41-53.
35. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 325-26 (4th ed. 1998).
36. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 41-46. In 1993, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Second Department, declined to recognize a surviving same-sex
partner as the equivalent of a spouse under the New York state law that grants to a
spouse the right to make an election of right against a decedent-spouse's will. In re
Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798-99 (App. Div. 1993). The court explained that under
New York State law, if a spouse willed away his or her entire estate, such spouse
could make a right of election giving him or her one-half of the estate if there were no
remaining issue, and one-third of the estate in the event of remaining issue. Id. at 798.
The court refused to broaden what it felt was the legislature's clear definition of a
spouse as a husband or wife. Id.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2002).
38. See Unif. Probate Code, 8 U.L.A. § 1-101 (1993 & Supp. 2003) (amended
2003); Marissa J. Holob, Note, Respecting Commitment: A Proposalto Prevent Legal
Barriersfrom Obstructingthe Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1492,
1499 (2000).
39. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 560:2-102 (Supp. 2001).
40. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(1) (2002) (granting to civil union partners the
benefits "relating to title, tenure, descent and distribution, intestate succession, waiver
of will, survivorship, or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership, or transfer, inter
vivos or at death, of real or personal property").
41. Cal. Prob. Code § 6401(c) (2003) (setting forth how property will be
distributed to the "surviving spouse or surviving domestic partner").
42. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 41.
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surviving same-sex partner is effectively a "mere stranger" under the
eyes of the law.43
Same-sex couples have the ability to circumvent the pitfalls of state

probate law by creating a will that names a same-sex partner as a
beneficiary of the decedent's property upon death.' Family members,
however, can contest wills and they often do when they either do not
know about, or disapprove of, the decedent's same-sex relationship.4 5

A same-sex partner's need to be considered a beneficiary of an
estate is particularly significant in the September 11, 2001 context,
where under requirements established for the federal September 11

Victim Compensation Fund, only one personal representativeusually the primary
beneficiary of the estate-may file a claim on
46
behalf of a victim.
43. Id. At least one commentator has argued that the primary goals of intestacy
laws include: (1) the distribution of property in a fashion that emulates the
distribution the decedent would have chosen had she created a will; (2) the execution
of an equitable distribution of property among family members; (3) protecting a
financially dependent family by ensuring it collects its share of property; and (4)
upholding and encouraging the sanctity of the nuclear family. See Holob, supra note
38, at 1499-1501; see also E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to
Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 Or. L. Rev. 255,
269-89 (2002) (setting forth four similar values-donative freedom, reciprocity,
reliance and ease of administration-that intestacy laws should try to realize). These
goals, in part, support past changes in intestacy laws. Specifically, the divergence in
the Uniform Probate Code from prior intestacy statutes that often did not leave
surviving spouses with a great enough share of the estate. The Uniform Probate Code
bequeathed a greater share of the estate to surviving spouses under the rationale that
that was what most decedents would have wanted. See Martin L. Fried, The Uniform
Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 927, 929
(1992) ("From the beginning, a distinctive feature of the UPC intestate distribution
pattern was the increase in the share passing to the surviving spouse."). While
legislators draft intestacy statutes to respect a decedent's donative intent by
fashioning distribution based on what the decedent probably would have wanted,
such statutes actually often limit that freedom by requiring that a minimum
percentage of property be given to a surviving spouse. See Holob, supra, at 1501. The
importance placed on a surviving spouse punctuates the imbalance felt by surviving
same-sex partners who may have lived their lives in all regards as a spouse but are
now treated as a "stranger."
44. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 45; see also Hayden Curry et al., A Legal Guide
for Lesbian and Gay Couples 5/15-17 (10th ed. 1999) (providing a "how-to" on will
preparation, including sample forms).
45. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 41-49; Gross, supra note 15. Gross's article tells
the story of one man who had lived with his now deceased same-sex partner for more
than twenty-six years. Because his partner had never legally divorced his former wife,
she, along with their financially independent son, would receive his Army pension,
Social Security and Workers' Compensation payments. Id. For other couples whose
families accepted the relationship, directing payment is easier. Id.; see also Diana B.
Henriques & David Barstow, Head of Fund Says Families Should State Their Cases,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2001, at B8 ("Luz Ortiz, the niece of Gloria Nieves... was
seeking help on behalf of her aunt's 15-year-old son. The boy's mother, although
living with a lesbian partner, was married .... [The niece] was hopeful that.., the
compensation award went to Ms. Nieves's son.").
46. See Susan J. Becker, Tumbling Towers as Turning Points: Will 9/11 Usher in a
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2. Survivor Benefits
Survivor benefits accorded to married couples under state and
federal law, and under employer-created programs, come in a number
of forms. As previously noted,47 among others, healthcare benefits,
pension funds, life insurance, tax breaks and workers' compensation
are all automatically conferred to married spouses.48 The importance
of these benefits is undeniable because healthcare benefits alone
constitute a large part of an employee's total compensation package.
The total value is heightened when you consider that many of these
benefits are, for tax purposes, excluded from the employee's gross
income.49
The availability of these benefits to a spouse or partner after death
depends on who is named as the beneficiary in the applicable
insurance policy.5" While employees with same-sex partners have the
ability to name those partners as beneficiaries, problems arise in
instances where there is no naming of the beneficiary or the
beneficiary form is simply incomplete. In these scenarios, payout will
depend on the employer's policy with respect to domestic partners.5
While many municipalities and employers allow for the naming of
domestic partners as beneficiaries of certain benefits, others do not. 2
Where a payor, such as an insurance company, does not recognize a
domestic partner in the same class as a spouse, a default payout
(where a beneficiary is not named) cannot be made to a domestic
partner, and he or she will receive nothing.53
Lastly, federal benefits such as social security are restricted to
"spouses" and, under the Defense of Marriage Act,54 same-sex
partners are precluded from being considered spouses.55
3. Wrongful Death Actions and Survival Claims
Wrongful death actions are tort actions reserved to a certain class of
people who survive the death of a spouse or close relative. 56 All states

New Civil Rights Era for Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States?, 9 Wm. & Mary
J. Women & L. 207, 233-36,234 n.138 (2003); Knauer, supra note 23, at 47.
47. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
48. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay
Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 107, 126-30 (1996); Knauer, supra note 23, at 49-51.
49. See Knauer, supra note 26, at 342-43. Professor Knauer further discusses the
tax disadvantages felt by same-sex couples. Id.
50. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 49-50.
51. Id. at 49-51.
52. See, e.g., infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
53. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 49-51.
54. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). See infra note 143 for a
discussion of the Defense of Marriage Act.
55. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 49.
56. See Culhane, supra note 22, at 955-56.
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have wrongful death statutes allowing beneficiaries of victims of

negligent or intentional homicides to pursue claims against a
tortfeasor to compensate them for their losses.57 The case law
demonstrates that both same sex partners58 and unmarried
heterosexual partners5 9 are rarely members of this class of potential
beneficiaries. The identification of beneficiaries is made by statute,

which either explicitly lists the class of beneficiaries,' refers to the
state's intestacy

combination of

statute to

both.6 2

determine

who is eligible,6 1 or

a

In any of these scenarios, same-sex partners

are statutorily ineligible in all states except California, Hawaii, and
Vermont.6 3

Survival statutes permit the victim's estate to bring tort actions for
certain losses experienced by a victim, including injury to tangible
property and personal injury. 6' A same-sex partner of a victim may
share in a survival recovery only if she is a beneficiary of the partner's
estate.65 This recovery, however, does not compensate the victim's

same-sex survivor for her loss.6 6 The survivor of a New York victim is
particularly limited because a decedent's pain and suffering before
death is not compensable under New York State law.67
B. Nonmarital RelationshipsHave Gained Limited Legal Recognition
Part I.A. discussed how unmarried couples are legally
disadvantaged relative to married couples. In the event of a partner's
57. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. ch. 768.16-.27 (1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-1 (1999); Ind.
Code § 34-23-1-1, 34-23-2-1 (1998); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.1 to 5-4.5
(McKinney 2002).
58. Culhane, supra note 22, at 967-72; see, e.g., Raum v. Rest. Assocs., Inc., 675
N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that the same-sex partner of a decedent does
not have a wrongful death claim under the applicable statute, which "operates
without regard to sexual orientation, in that unmarried couples living together,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, similarly lack the right to bring a wrongfuldeath action, and, as such, the statute does not discriminate against same-sex partners
in spousal-type relationships").
59. Culhane, supra note 22, at 957-60.
60. Id. at 955-56 nn.209-12.
61. Id. at 956 n.213.
62. Id.
63. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 (West Supp. 2003) (including "domestic partner"
among those persons with standing); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-3(b) (Supp. 2001)
(including "reciprocal beneficiary" in the list of people who may maintain an action);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(2) (2002) (including "causes of action related to or
dependent upon spousal status, including an action for wrongful death" among a
nonexclusive list of legal benefits given to parties in civil unions).
64. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.140 (Michie 1998) (allowing for the survival
of rights of action for personal injury and injury to real and personal property, but
excluding actions for slander); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (allowing
for the survival of all personal injuries and personal and real property).
65. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 52.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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death, a survivor is left without the monetary support that widowed
spouses gain automatically. Part I.B. describes how unmarried samesex couples, facing these disadvantages, have fought to attain the
privileges only available to married couples. Unmarried couples
traditionally have sought recourse through both the legislative
process68 and litigation.6 9 This section discusses how unmarried
couples have sought to attain legal status in certain contexts. A great
deal of the progress has been accomplished through the courts.7"
1. Co-Habitational Relationships
The courts' recognition of a couple's unmarried but co-habitational
relationship begins with Marvin v. Marvin.7 1 Marvin confronted the
issue of whether unmarried but heterosexual couples can privately
contract to define their relationships. The California Supreme Court
found an express contract between such a couple based on their oral
agreement to live together, hold themselves out to others
(figuratively) as husband and wife, and share income.7 2 The case
arose when the defendant-"husband" compelled the plaintiff-"wife"
to leave his house, after which he provided support to her for about
one and one-half years but, thereafter, ceased making support
payments.7 3 At that point, the plaintiff brought suit to recover her
share of their common property and continuing support payments,
under the original oral agreement.74 The court made clear that when
determining whether such an agreement between a co-habiting couple
exists, future courts should look to the parties' conduct throughout the
co-habitation.
Also critical to the court's holding is its
announcement that non-marital relationships are not invalid, per se,
even though they are sexual relationships existing outside the
institution of marriage. 76 The court stated that "[a]greements
between nonmarital partners fail only to the extent that they rest upon
a consideration of meretricious sexual services. '77 Consequently, if
68. See, e.g., infra Part I.C.
69. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 134-52.
70. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal
History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551 (1993) (providing a historical recount of gay rights
litigation).
71. 557 P.2d 106 (Ca. 1976).
72. Id. at 110.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 122. ("The courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to
determine whether the conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied
agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between
the parties. The courts may, when appropriate, employ principles of constructive
trust or resulting trust." (citations omitted)).
76. Id. at 113 (noting that a sexual relationship, even outside of marriage, does not
invalidate agreements between a couple concerning earnings, property, or expenses).
77. Id.
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the meretricious sexual services are additional to other, good
consideration, a court will sever the meretricious sexual services

component and uphold the other consideration.78 Since the ruling,

most jurisdictions have followed the express agreement rule,7 9 while
others have rejected it,"° and certain others have distinguished it,
weakening its import."'
The judiciary's recognition of express agreements between
cohabiting couples, however, has most often extended solely to

heterosexual couples; there are far fewer instances where a same-sex
couple's express agreement has been enforced. 2 For example, in

Jones v. Daly,83 the California Court of Appeal, Second Division,

denied the enforcement of an express cohabitors' agreement between
a same-sex couple even though the pair shared their wages, and one
party's consideration was to act as a lover, companion, and general

partner to the other.'

Per the Marvin decision, the court's rationale

turned on its view that the consideration given was meretricious and,

therefore, inadequate to enforce an agreement. 85

While the

understanding between the parties was almost identical to that in
Marvin, the court came to the opposite conclusion. 6 While Marvin
78. Id. at 114 ("In sum, a court will not enforce a contract for the pooling of
property and earnings if it is explicitly and inseparably based upon services as a
paramour." (emphasis added)); see also Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405,
409 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, and business
partner services comprise adequate consideration independent of sexual services).
79. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 907 (N.J. 1979) ("The mores
of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that we
cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently
been so widely abandoned by so many."); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157
(N.Y. 1980) ("Changing social custom has increased greatly the number of persons
living together without solemnized ceremony and consequently without benefit of the
rules of law that govern property and financial matters between married couples.").
80. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) ("The parties being
unmarried and the appellant having admitted the fact of cohabitation in both verified
pleadings, this would constitute immoral consideration under [the Georgia Code].");
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-11 (11. 1979) (declining to follow Marvin on
public policy grounds and reasoning that recognition of such relationships is better
left to legislative determination).
81. For example, Minnesota and Texas require such a cohabitation agreement to
be in writing. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 513.075-76 (West 2002); Tex Bus. & Com. Code
Ann. § 26.01(b)(3) (Vernon 2002); see generally Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary
Cohabitation, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1381, 1395-96 (2001). For a collection of
perspectives on Marvin's legacy and the current lay of the land for unmarried
cohabitors, see Symposium, UnmarriedPartnersand the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin,
76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1261 (2001).
82. See Merin, supra note 17, at 192.
83. 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
84. Id. at 131.
85. Id. at 133.
86. See Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 32, at 784. But see Whorton v. Dillingham,
248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding an express agreement between two
men where, notwithstanding their sexual relationship, one man acted as chauffeur,
bodyguard, secretary and business partner to the other). Jones's misapplication of
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and its progeny have not resulted in the per se recognition of same-sex
couples on an implied contract theory, the cases have provided
couples guidance on how to best protect themselves. 7
A sampling of other areas pertinent to same-sex couples that have
been and continue to be litigated include whether a same-sex partner
has standing to sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress when
he or she witnesses an injury to her partner,88 whether a co-habiting
same-sex partner qualifies as a family member under a rent-control
law in order to evade eviction,8 9 and whether the denial of
employment benefits to same-sex partners of state employees is sex
discrimination and violates a state's privileges and immunities clause.'
2. Domestic Partnership
In response to judicial challenges and the reality that families come
in many forms, state and other local governments have begun to
provide limited recognition to same-sex couples. 9' The most common
governmental solution is a domestic partnership scheme. 2 Domestic
Marvin has been criticized on the grounds that the court wrongfully emphasized the
sexual aspect of the relationship without giving due credit to those other facets of the
relationship that served as good consideration, such as those found in Whorton. See,
e.g., Sharmila Roy Grossman, Comment, The Illusory Rights of Marvin v. Marvin for
the Same-Sex Couple Versus the Preferable CanadianAlternative-M. v. H., 38 Cal.
W. L. Rev. 547, 554-55 (2002).
87. A same-sex couple's best approach in seeking legal recognition of the
agreements established within their relationship is to enter into an express, written
agreement outlining the basis for the relationship, ownership rights in individual and
common property, and dispute resolution procedures, among others. See, e.g., Crook
v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (upholding a written agreement governing a
couple's mutual contribution toward improvement of their real estate and sharing of
expenses and assets); see also Curry et al., supra note 44, at 6/2-6/18, 6/3 (a "how to"
guide emphasizing the lesson learned from Jones and other cases that one person's
consideration in the relationship should not be meretricious); Craig W. Christensen,
Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1299, 1341 (1997) (noting that "[f]or the prescient same-sex partners who
think to plan for and expressly decide their financial arrangements regarding property
and support, courts by and large are willing to give legal effect to their agreements").
For couples who fail to memorialize their understanding, or in cases where such
understanding changes over the life of the relationship, the courts are loath to enforce
such an implied contract. Id. at 1342-45.
88. See Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-78 (Ct. App. 1987) (declining to
include an intimate homosexual partner in the class of close relatives eligible to
sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
89. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (defining a
"family member" eligible to succeed to a rent regulated apartment to include an adult
lifetime partner whose relationship with the deceased demonstrated emotional and
financial interdependence).
90. See Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a governmental entity's denial of insurance benefits to the same-sex
partners of its employees violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon
Constitution).
91. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 11, at 1168-75.
92. Id. at 1186.
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partnership legislation runs the gamut from municipal domestic
partnership ordinances conferring a limited set of benefits and
responsibilities, such as certain health care benefits, to the broadest
statewide legislation, such as Vermont's civil union statute, which
accords to same-sex couples the full panoply of rights and
responsibilities given to married opposite-sex couples. 9 3 Domestic
partnership has been described as one step further toward the
recognition of legal rights than co-habitation and one step less than
marriage. 94 Accordingly, while inroads have been made in certain
jurisdictions to earn same-sex couples particular rights, the rights
conferred on heterosexual couples through marriage still vastly
outnumber those given to same-sex couples.95
The core arguments for domestic partnership usually encapsulate
the following premise: the definition of "family" should transcend the
traditional husband, wife, and 1.86 children paradigm,96 and the state's
sole recognition of these units should be broadened to include other
families.97 Such other families should include those that meet the
93. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002). The statute provides: "Parties
to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under
law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common
law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage." Id. §
1204(a). In contrast, many municipal ordinances offer few benefits. See infra note 108
and accompanying text. The legislative and judicial approaches can intersect:
Vermont's civil union law is one product of joint-legislative and judicial action. See
Johnson, supra note 32, at 36-37 ("Rather than creating a combative atmosphere
between the two branches, the Vermont Supreme Court's collaborative approach
empowered the legislature to fashion its own just and constitutional remedy.").
Lawyers seeking social reform in varying contexts debate which method is the most
productive. See, e.g., Ross Sandier & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree:
What Happens when Courts Run Government (2003). Professors Sandier and
Schoenbrod argue that historically it was politics and politicians spurring legislative
change, rather than progress in the courts, that was most effective: "Yet, on balance,
the courts rode the wave of history rather than set it in motion. Seen from this
broader perspective, the heroism in the courthouse is no less heroic, but of a different
nature." Id. at 33.
94. Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility,
32 San Diego L. Rev. 163, 165 (1995). One alternative view analogizes same-sex and
opposite-sex cohabitation to a business partnership. See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage
as a Trade: Bridging the Private/PrivateDistinction, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79,
101-12 (2001).
95. See supra Part I.A.
96. See Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000, at 57
(1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/secOl.pdf.
97. See Ettelbrick, supra note 48, at 132-52. Professor Ettelbrick argues that the
policy goal undergirding the provision of certain benefits to families should be
followed:
As long as legally recognized family status is the gateway to benefits and
privileges, the question must be asked whether the policy goal for providing
the benefit is furthered or diminished by allowing access only to married or
biological family members. Access to benefits and privileges should be
guided by a desire to fulfill the purpose for which those benefits are
provided, not by rigid definitions of family.
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traditional indicia of the institution-including, but not limited to,
monogamy, financial interdependence, and age requirements-but
have a different face.9" One commentator sums up the question that
seems logical to many, and is often posed to support domestic
partnership laws: "If the strongest of public policy goals is to support
families.., is there any justification for allowing only those families
joined by marriage, or only those families biologically joined, to
partake in economic and social support?"9 9 In limited instances, states
have embraced this policy goal by using their powers to extend some
protections and benefits to same-sex couples.
a. Municipal Domestic PartnershipOrdinances
Domestic partnership, along with marriage, falls within the domain
of state regulation.'00 Because states are principally responsible for
the general welfare of their citizenry, their powers extend to
legislating in marriage, domestic partnerships, if applicable, and the
corresponding benefits reserved to each.1" 1
At a micro level,
municipalities within states can also legislate with respect to marriage
and domestic partnerships,0 2 although this right has been
challenged."0 3 Notwithstanding the challenges, it is at the municipal
Id. at 139.
98. Id. at 132-52.
99. Id. at 139.
100. See 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage§ 10 (2000).
101. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 133-34; see, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C (Michie
Supp. 2001) (reciprocal beneficiaries); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101 (Anderson 2003)
(marriage); Or. Rev. Stat. § 106 (2003) (marriage); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(2002) (civil unions); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 765 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (marriage).
102. Leonard, supra note 19, at 148-49; see, e.g., Ann Arbor, Mich. Code tit. IX, ch.
110
(1991)
(creating
a
domestic
partners
registry),
available at
http://livepublish.municode.com/12/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-hit-j.htm&2.0;
Boston, Mass., Public Health & Welfare Ordinance ch. 12-9A (1993) (creating a
domestic
partnership
registry
with
certain
benefits),
available at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=alp:bosto
nima; New York, N.Y., Admin. Code §§ 3-240 to 3-245 (Supp. 2003) (creating a
domestic partnership registry and process for registration); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code
ch. 62 (1991) (allowing for the registration of domestic partnerships and granting
health
benefits
to
partners
of
city
employees),
available
at
http://www.amlegal.com/sfadmin-nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=
alp:s admin.
103. Most challenges are based on the common argument that the municipality has
overreached its lawmaking authority by legislating in the area of marriage-an area
usually reserved to the state. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity of
Governmental Domestic PartnershipEnactment, 74 A.L.R.5th 439, 444-45 (1999); see
generally Bowman & Cornish, supra note 11, at 1198-203 (noting that while courts
have clarified that it is the states' duty to define civil status, politics make it difficult
for most states to recognize non-marital unions). Resolution of the dispute normally
turns on whether the municipality conflicts with, and is preempted by, state law. See
Miller, supra, at 445. In Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999), the domestic partnership ordinance in question made employee benefits
available to unmarried, same-sex partners of its city employees. Id. at 99-100. The
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level that most progress for the recognition of domestic partnerships
has been made."°
Municipalities have led the charge in the fight for benefits for samesex couples'015 by enacting measures designed to extend the benefits of
marriage either solely to same-sex couples or to same-sex couples and

plaintiff-taxpayers argued that in creating this ordinance the city "acted beyond the
scope of its home rule authority, which does not allow it to create a new marital
status, domestic partnership, or grant the same employee benefits, legal rights and
privileges that the City gives to the married spouses of its employees." Id. at 96. The
Illinois appellate court held that the state constitution allowed municipalities to
govern and legislate concurrently with the state in areas of common interest unless
explicitly preempted. Id. at 96-97. While defining and regulating the institution of
marriage was of statewide rather than local concern, the municipality was not
legislating with respect to marital status at all. Instead, its legislation was merely
extending health benefits to a certain class of people residing with city employees, id.
at 98, an action within the realm of its role in legislating with regard to public health,
id. at 97. A similar ordinance in Atlanta has withstood attack on similar grounds. In
City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997), the Georgia Supreme Court
held constitutional an Atlanta ordinance that extended certain insurance benefits to
"dependents" of city employees who were registered as domestic partners under
Atlanta's domestic partnership ordinance. Id. at 194. The court reasoned that the
benefits ordinance legislated in an allowable area within its home rule authority: the
health of its employees and their dependents. Id. at 195-96. Further, the definition of
"dependent" in the ordinance was constitutional because it referred to a person who
relies on another for financial support. Id. at 195. This definition differed from the
one used in a preceding version of the ordinance that had been previously held
unconstitutional. City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995). In
McKinney, the court held unconstitutional a preceding version of the insurance
benefits ordinance that did not define the term "dependent." Id. at 521. The court
interpreted the ordinance to impermissibly recognize domestic partners as family
members-comparable to spouses-and extend to them insurance benefits. Id.
Consequently, the ordinance was held constitutional when viewed as a means by
which to provide benefits to someone who was simply relying on someone else for
financial support, see Morgan, 492 S.E.2d at 195, as opposed to being viewed as
someone who was a "spouse" of an individual of the same sex. See McKinney, 454
S.E.2d at 521.
104. Leonard, supra note 19, at 147. Professor Leonard notes that one argument
municipalities face in opposition to granting domestic partner benefits solely to samesex couples is that their ordinances exclude unmarried heterosexual couples who
neither benefit from marriage nor same-sex couple benefits. Id. at 147-48. While
some argue that the two groups cannot be compared because heterosexuals have the
ability to marry, certain municipalities, in response, have extended their domestic
partner ordinances to both sets of couples. Id. at 148; see also Craig W. Christensen, If
Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of
Marriage," 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1699, 1739 (1998) ("The failure of political will to
provide a viable alternative to marriage for same-sex couples is nowhere more
apparent than in the state capitols of the nation."); Jonathan Andrew Hein, Caring
for the Evolving American Family: CohabitatingPartners and Employer Sponsored
Health Care, 30 N.M. L. Rev. 19, 31 (2000) ("Local governments are counted among
the leaders in introducing and experimenting with domestic partner benefits.").
105. Progress at the municipal level represents, in part, a response to the increase
in nontraditional families and changing social mores. See Bowman & Cornish, supra
note 11, at 1188-91. Such progress is arguably easier to achieve at the municipal level
because of the greater likelihood that a group of residents sharing a common political
ideology will have greater political power to implement it.
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unmarried heterosexual couples. 6 These measures vary widely in
terms of the scope of the benefits provided and their reach. Many
municipalities allow a same-sex couple to "register" their relationship
if it meets certain criteria, such as age, monogamy, and cohabitation." 7 On one end of the spectrum, registries provide no
benefit other than a symbolic one:
the ability to claim the
municipality recognizes the partnership.'
On the other end, which is
usually limited to employees of the municipality, the benefits are more
substantial: the partner of the employee is treated as if she is a spouse
and thus gains all of the benefits that are normally given through
employment. 9 An additional benefit associated with the more
comprehensive registries is the right to prison and hospital
visitation.' '
One of the more comprehensive registries is California's statewide
registry."' Passed into law in 2001, the registry allows for the
106. See Miller, supra note 103, at 444. Many domestic partnership measures apply
solely to same-sex couples, ostensibly because heterosexual couples are viewed as
having the ability to marry. Id. One example of the more inclusive approach is
Austin, Texas, where the ordinance-which extended benefits to both classes of
couples-was eventually overturned by a court under the argument that the inclusion
of unmarried heterosexual couples undercut Texas's interest in promoting
heterosexual marriage. Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180, 189 (Tex. App.
1998).
107. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 11, at 1192-93. In addition to detailing
existing domestic partnership requirements, Bowman and Cornish propose
requirements in a model domestic partnership law for future use. Similar indicia, such
as economic interdependency, monogamy and age, were used in New York's postSeptember 11, 2001 laws to determine which relationships were eligible for certain
monetary awards. See infra Part I.C.2. To no surprise, the elements implicit in
marriage, such as economic interdependency, monogamy and age, are often used.
108. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 11, at 1195.
109. The dearth of benefits available in the domestic partnership laws on the
former end of the spectrum has been criticized. See Christensen, supra note 104, at
1734 ("The much-heralded advent of local domestic partnership laws, for example, is
mostly about modest symbolic gestures accompanied by few if any tangible benefits.")
As of March 2004, there were 140 city, county and state governments that extend
some form of benefits to the same-sex partners of their employees. See The Human
Rights
Campaign
Foundation,
Work
Life,
at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=TheIssues&Template=/TaggedPage/Tagg
edPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=26&ContentID=13399 (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
110. See Heidi Eischen, Survey, For Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent
Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation, 31 U. Tol. L. Rev. 527, 530
(2000).
111. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 297-299 (West Supp. 2004). The registry allows for a
domestic partnership between two individuals of the same sex or between a man and
a woman where one individual is older than sixty-two-years-old. Id. § 297(b)(6). The
couple must share a common residence, jointly share responsibility for expenses, and
the individuals must be at least eighteen-years-old and not be married or blood
related. Id. § 297(b)(1)-(5). For a description of the registry's requirements and the
benefits it offers, see Megan E. Callan, Comment, The More, the Not Marry-Er: In
Search of a Policy Behind Eligibility for California Domestic Partnerships,40 San
Diego L. Rev. 427, 429-36 (2003). California is also home to the nation's first
municipality offering a domestic partner registry: Berkeley. After Berkeley, other
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adoption by one domestic partner of the other's child,' 12 recovery
rights in negligent infliction of emotional distress actions," 3 standing
for wrongful death claims,' 1 4 and eligibility for employment benefits
where an individual's domestic partner is a state employee.' 15 Of
course, this last benefit is limited in that it leaves those people whose
partners are not state employees to seek benefits
through a private
16
employer, or face finding them on their own."
One way to cast the domestic partner benefits net wider is espoused
by the City and County of San Francisco's Equal Benefits Ordinance
(the "Ordinance"), which obligates all private companies contracting
with the city or county to offer the same benefits to the same-sex
partners of its employees that it offers to the spouses of its employees,
or be ineligible to contract." 7 The Ordinance, however, has been
successfully challenged in the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that it
directly conflicts with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA")," 8 which preempts state and local laws relating to
employee benefit plans. 1 9 In another Ninth Circuit case, the issue of

major American cities followed: West Hollywood, CA; Madison, WI; Los Angeles,
CA; Seattle, WA; New York, NY; and San Francisco, CA. See Bowman & Cornish,
supra note 11, at 1188-90.
112. Cal. Fam. Code § 9000 (West Supp. 2004). The statute provides that: "A
domestic partner, as defined in Section 297, desiring to adopt a child of his or her
domestic partner may for that purpose file a petition in the county in which the
petitioner resides." Id. § 9000(b).
113. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.01 (West Supp. 2004) ("Domestic partners shall be
entitled to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress to the same
extent that spouses are entitled to do so under California law.").
114. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 (West Supp. 2004).
115. Cal. Gov't Code § 22873(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("Any employer or contracting
agency may, at its option, offer health benefits pursuant to this article, to the domestic
partners of its employees and annuitants.").
116. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of how samesex couples attain such benefits through the private sector.
117. S.F.,
Cal.,
Admin.
Code
ch.
12b,
c
(1996),
available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights-index.asp?id=4584.
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). ERISA is a broad federal law governing
employers' provision of fringe benefits, such as vacations, severance pay, health
benefits and disability payments, to their employees. See Mark A. Rothstein et al., 1
Employment Law § 3.19, at 459-62 (2d ed. 1999). It is intended to protect employees:
"[It protects the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries in enforcing any benefit promise the employer does make by
establishing certain minimum standards for all covered plans." Id. at 459.
119. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 266 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Jeffrey A. Brauch, Municipal Activism v. Federal Law: Why ERISA Preempts
San Francisco-Style Domestic PartnerOrdinances,28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 925, 961-62
(1998) (arguing that, while ERISA's scope had recently been limited by the U.S.
Supreme Court, it had not been nullified and, consequently, San Francisco's
ordinance should be unenforceable: "It is... the very type of law that Congress
meant to preempt."). Others have argued that ERISA should not preempt state laws
requiring private employers to award benefits to the domestic partners of their
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ERISA preemption was avoided where the court held that the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claim. 120 While its survival under
ERISA preemption is shaky, San Francisco's ordinance has acted as a
blueprint for similar ordinances in other jurisdictions, including
Berkeley, California; Los Angeles, California; and Seattle,
Washington. 21
Challenges to the Ordinance constitute only one
example of the broader set of challenges waged against similar
ordinances. 22
b. Civil Union Law and Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law
There are a total of ten states 23 and the District of Columbia124 that
grant certain health benefits to the same-sex partners of their
employees. While California and New York employ domestic
partnership schemes for state employees, Hawaii and Vermont go
further through a "reciprocal beneficiaries" scheme and a civil union
institution, respectively.
In Baehr v. Lewin, 25 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted sex
discrimination that was a presumably unconstitutional violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution.2 6 The court
employees. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnershipand ERISA Preemption,76
Tul. L. Rev. 373,403-27 (2001).
120. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of S.F., 253 F.3d 461, 474-76 (9th Cir. 2001)
(affirming the district court's determination that plaintiff lacked standing for its claim
that ERISA preempted the San Francisco ordinance). The court held the ordinance
neither violated the Commerce Clause, id. at 470-71, nor did San Francisco overreach
in its municipal governance by creating an ordinance that conflicted with the
California State Constitution, id. at 474.
121. See Merin, supra note 17, at 202.
122. See generally Miller, supra note 103, at 439-52 (documenting cases challenging
domestic partnership ordinances on the grounds that such ordinances overextend
municipalities' home-rule authority).
123. See The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Work Life, at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search-theDatabase&Template=/Custo
mSourcelWorkNetlWorkplacePolicySearch.cfm&DPHealth=state&submitted=l&ref
resh=1 (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). As of March 2004, ten states grant health benefits
to the same-sex partners of their employees. Id. On January 8, 2004, the New Jersey
Senate passed a bill recognizing domestic partnerships at the state level. Laura
Mansnerus, New Jersey to Recognize Gay Couples, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2004, at B1.
The bill is expected to be signed into law by New Jersey Governor James E.
McGreevey. Id. The legislation allows a domestic partner to make medical decisions
for his or her partner, extends health coverage and pension benefits to the partners of
state employees, and requires insurance companies to provide health care coverage to
domestic partners equivalent to that of spouses. Id.
124. See The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, District of Columbia Laws
Affecting
GLBT
People,
at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search theLaw-Database&Template=/C
ustomSource/Law/StateDisplay.cfm&StateCode=DC&LawFlag=l&Statuslnd=lawcur
rent (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
125. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
126. Id. at 67.
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remanded the case, directing the trial court to determine whether the
discrimination was justified by a narrowly tailored compelling state
interest. 127 On remand, the trial court held that the defendant had
failed to meet its burden of proving a narrowly tailored compelling
state interest. 128 In response to these decisions, the Hawaii state
legislature passed its Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act in July 1997.129 The
Act allows both same-sex and opposite-sex Hawaiian couples who
cannot or do not want to marry to register their relationships with the
state, in exchange for many, but not all, of the benefits afforded to
married Hawaiian couples.13 The benefits include the right to hold
property jointly as a tenancy by the entirety,'3 1 standing for wrongful
death claims, 32 and hospital visitation rights.'33 While the Act does
not grant all of the benefits given to married couples, 3 4 the list is more
extensive than that of similar domestic partnership ordinances.135 This
tremendous victory was tempered, though, by the Hawaii state
legislature's subsequent amendment to the Hawaii Constitution
allowing the state legislature to1 3define
marriage as a relationship
6
solely between a man and woman.
Similarly, the Vermont state legislature passed its groundbreaking
Civil Union Law'37 in response to the decision handed down by the

127. Id.
128. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
129. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572C (Michie Supp. 2001). The Hawaii State
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause is similar to that of the United States
Constitution. It states, "No person shall be... denied the equal protection of the
laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights." Haw. Const. art. I, § 5.
130. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572C-3 to -5.
131. Id. § 509-2.
132. Id. § 663-3.
133. Id. § 323-2.
134. Id. § 572C-6.
135. The most generous domestic partnership ordinances only grant health
insurance to their employees' same-sex partners. See supra notes 107-10 and
accompanying text.
136. Haw. Const. art. I., § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples."). See generally David Orgon Coolidge, The
Hawai'i MarriageAmendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 19
(2000) (recounting in detail the history leading to the amendment's passage and
exploring the amendment's potential meaning). A similar sequence of events
occurred further north in Alaska. In 1998, the Alaska Superior Court held that the
denial of a marriage license to two men was a presumable violation of the state
constitution on privacy and equal protection grounds that was subject to strict
scrutiny. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Stat., No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). Soon thereafter, the Alaska state legislature
amended the state constitution to define marriage to be solely between a man and a
woman, thereby rendering the issue in the Brause decision moot. Alaska Const. art. I,
§ 25 ("To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one
man and one woman.").
137. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2002).
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Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State.'38 In Baker, the Court held

that a denial to same-sex couples of the benefits incidental to marriage
was a violation of the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont State
Constitution. 139 The Court ordered the state legislature to devise a

remedy, or else the litigants could return to the courts for the relief
they originally sought.140 As a result, the legislature passed the Civil
Union Law, thereby creating an institution parallel to marriage for
same-sex partners.

41

Because it bestows to such couples every right,

benefit, and obligation given to married couples in Vermont (except
the name "marriage"), it is by far the most comprehensive legislative
measure adopted in the United States with regard to same-sex
benefits. 42 However,
comparable legislation has not been instituted
43
at the federal level.
138. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
139. See id. at 886. The Common Benefits Clause is the counterpart to the United
States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886-87.
141. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1201-07.
142. Id.; see Johnson, supra note 31, at 58 ("[Clivil unions are so much like
marriage that there is not all that much room to create something totally new and
different." (citation omitted)).
143. In 2001, U.S. Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts introduced a bill
that would provide to same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex partners of federal
employees benefits currently limited to the spouses of federal employees. Domestic
Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 2001, H.R. 638, 107th Cong. (2001). For a
description of the bill, see The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Domestic
Partners
Benefits
and
Obligations
Act
(H.R.
2426/S.
1252),
at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=DomesticPartnership-Benefits-andObli
gationsActl (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). To qualify under the law, couples would be
required to satisfy a set of requirements similar to statutes in effect at the state and
local levels. These requirements include: that individuals be eighteen years or older;
they not be blood related in a way that, if they were of different sexes, they would be
prohibited from marrying; they share a common residence; and they also share (to a
certain degree) common financial obligations and a common welfare. Id. There had
been no change in the status of the Bill until its reintroduction in the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives in June 2003 by co-sponsors, Representative Barney Frank
and Senator Mark Dayton. The Human Rights Campaign issued a press release
calling for support of the proposed Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations
Act. See Press Release, The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, HRC Commends
Reintroduction of Domestic Partner Bill for Federal Employees:
Domestic
Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act Would Bring Federal Government Benefits
in
Line
with
Corporate
America
(June
11,
2003),
at
http://www.hrc.orgfTemplate.cfm?Section=DomesticPartnership-Benefitsand-Obli
gationsActl&CONTENTID=10081&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Content
Display.cfm. The proposed law received support from several presidential candidates
as well as certain organizations, including the American Federation of Government
Employees and Harvard University. Id. Regardless of a municipality or state's ability
or willingness to view and treat same-sex couples as equivalent to married,
heterosexual couples, neither can give access to the 1,049 protections given to married
couples under federal law. Congress asked the U.S. General Accounting Office to
provide it with a list of all "federal laws in which benefits, rights, and privileges are
contingent on marital status." U.S. General Accounting Office, Letter Report on the
Defense
of
Marriage
Act,
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=og97016.txt&directory=/diskb/wais
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/data/gao (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). The Office responded with a list of "1,049
federal laws classified to the United States Code in which marital status is a factor."
Id. The so-called Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), passed in 1996, ensured this
by defining marriage, for federal purposes, as a relationship available solely to a man
and a woman. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Consequently, a Vermont or Hawaii same-sex
couple does not qualify for benefits under DOMA. Indeed, DOMA was passed in
reaction to the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision: "[DOMA] was quietly signed by
President Clinton, [in] response to a decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court that made
it likely that same-sex marriage will soon be legal in that state." Andrew Koppelman,
Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of MarriageAct is Unconstitutional,83 Iowa L.
Rev. 1, 1 (1997).
DOMA's second feature further, and perhaps even more
alarmingly, injures same-sex couples by giving states an explicit right to not recognize
a relationship from a sister state, thereby giving states the option not to honor a civil
union entered into in Vermont or a reciprocal beneficiary relationship entered into in
Hawaii. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) ("No State... shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State ....
").The second feature does this first by nullifying any
potential right a state would have under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize
such a foreign relationship. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."). While
the Supreme Court has never applied the Full Faith and Credit Clause to a question
of marriage, the possibility is now extinguished because DOMA's text precludes such
a possibility. See Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act and the
Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1449-52, 1450
(1997) ("With DOMA, Congress forecloses what had been an open question about
how the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to marriages."). Second, it influences
the application of the common law conflicts of law rule so that states may deny
recognition of such relationships. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. The common law conflict of
laws rule is that states are not obligated to recognize marriages from other
jurisdictions where it would violate a strong public policy of the forum in which the
question arises. See Koppelman, supra, at 10. Traditionally, under the common law
conflicts of law rule a state will recognize a marriage from another jurisdiction unless
it violates its own public policy. Ruskay-Kidd, supra, at 1447-49. While an initial read
of DOMA's text may appear to merely reinforce this rule, it tramples on an important
caveat of the rule, namely, the limitation that the ability to ignore a foreign
relationship is limited solely to the state with the most significant relationship to the
couple. Id. This power is now extended to all states, regardless of its connection to
the couple. At least thirty-four states have since enacted "junior-DOMAs," i.e.,
statutes allowing the state to not recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in
another state. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lecture, Equality Practice: LiberalReflections
on the Jurisprudenceof Civil Unions, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 853, 862 (2001); see also Mark
Strasser, When Is a ParentNot a Parent?On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions
of Parenthood, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 299, 305-10 (2001). Unless defeated on
constitutional grounds, a junior-DOMA would most likely prevent recognition of a
civil union entered into in Vermont. Eskridge, supra, at 862. Also of note at the
federal level is the fact that the Internal Revenue Service does not recognize the
benefits given to same-sex partners by employers. Merin, supra note 17, at 199.
Normally, benefits given to the spouse of an employee are not included in the
employee's gross income. However, the opposite is true with domestic partners: any
benefits received are taxable unless the other partner qualifies as a dependent. Id. at
199 n.124. Qualifying as a dependent, however, would be impossible if the
relationship between the two is violative of local law. This was the case for same-sex
couples living in a jurisdiction with sodomy laws on its books prior to the Supreme
Court's invalidation of such laws in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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c. Employer-GrantedBenefits
While clearly important and valuable to all same-sex couples, most
domestic partnership laws passed by municipalities offer the greatest
benefits only to municipal employees and their partners and, thus,
work only as a symbolic victory for other couples not employed by the
municipality.'" Another means by which same-sex couples can obtain
marriage-type benefits occurs in the private sector through their
employers. 45 Many private employers now grant to domestic partners
those benefits previously available only to their employees' spouses.
As of April 2004, 7,009 United States private sector companies and
colleges and universities extended benefits to the same-sex partners of
their employees. 146 In 1982, New York City's Village Voice newspaper
was the first such private employer.'4 7 Thousands of companies have
followed, and today 210 of all Fortune 500 companies do the same. 48
3. Limited Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in New York
The New York Court of Appeals' landmark decision in Braschi v.
Stahl Associates Co. 149 and the evolution of New York City's Domestic
Partnership Law'50 serve as two examples of how New York has
provided certain rights and benefits to its same-sex couples that other
jurisdictions have not. Nonetheless, the benefits are limited and the
time taken to win them evidences the degree of resistance against the
legal recognition of these couples.
a. Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.
One judicial victory recognizing certain rights of same-sex couples
in New York State also stands as a significant national victory. In
1989, the New York Court of Appeals delivered a landmark victory to
same-sex couples living in New York City in its decision in Braschi v.
144. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
145. See generally Knauer, supra note 26, passim (arguing that while they are
beneficial to same-sex partners and a step in the right direction generally, marketderived benefits offered by employers are not the equivalent of the greater set of
benefits that should be automatically provided by law).
146. See The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Domestic Partner Benefits, at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=TheIssues&Template=/TaggedPage/Tagg
edPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=26&ContentlD=13399 (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
147. See The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, What Are Domestic Partner
Benefits?,
at
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu[WorkLife/GetInformed2/TheIssues/WhatAreDPB/Definition.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
148. See The Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Domestic Partner Benefits, at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=The-Issues&Template=TaggedPage/Tagg
edPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=26&ContentID=13399 (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
149. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
150. New York, N.Y., Admin. Code §§ 3-240 to -245 (Supp. 2003).
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In Braschi, a landlord sought to evict the

same-sex partner of a tenant of a rent-controlled apartment who had
died. 5 2 The City's rent-control regulation provided non-eviction
protection to the "surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some
other member of the deceased tenant's family."' 5 3 The term "family"

was undefined and the court held that it should not be narrowly
interpreted to exclude committed partners who merely lacked a
formalization of their relationship, such as a marriage certificate. 54

The court reasoned that the intent of the regulation was satisfied
because it protected an individual from sudden eviction, while still not

breaking down the line between committed couples and mere
roommates.'
The court then provided guidance to future courts
determining whether an individual satisfied this new family member
test by directing them to look to a multitude of factors, including:
"the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of

emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties
have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to
society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family
services."15' 6 This test clearly redefined family members to include a
tenant's same-sex partner.

The first lasting effect of the court's opinion is its codification in
New York tenancy laws. 57 A second effect of the Court's opinion is a
new willingness to move from interpreting "family" as a traditional,

heterosexual nuclear unit to interpreting it as one that "find[s] its
foundation in the reality of family life."' 58 The characteristics that the
court looked to in determining whether a couple qualifies are very
similar to those characteristics looked at in statutes defining what
constitutes "domestic partners.""' 9

151. 543 N.E.2d at 49 (1989).
152. Id. at 50-51.
153. Id. at 50 (quotations omitted).
154. Id. at 53-54.
155. Id. at 54.
156. Id. at 55.
157. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2520.6(o)(2) (2001).
158. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53. But see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28
(N.Y. 1991) (holding that a same-sex, former partner of a biological mother does not
constitute a "parent" for the purpose of establishing visitation rights of the biological
mother's child); In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (App. Div. 1993) (declining to
extend the reasoning in Braschi to a same-sex partner who sought a right of election
against his decedent partner's will). The court in Cooper stated, "We reject, as
meritless, the contention of both the petitioner and the arnicus curiae that, based on
the Court of Appeals decision in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co. . . . the traditional
definition of the term 'surviving spouse' must be rejected, and replaced with a
broader definition which would include the petitioner." Id.
159. See infra Part I.C. for examples of the post-September 11, 2001 New York
statutes that use criteria such as monogamy, age requirements, and economic
interdependence.
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b. New York City Domestic PartnershipLaw
New York City passed its Domestic Partnership Law in 1998,160
codifying two prior Mayoral Executive Orders.161 The first Mayoral
Executive Order was issued in 1989 by Mayor Ed Koch, who directed
city agencies to recognize domestic partners for purposes of
bereavement leave.16 2 In 1993, Mayor David Dinkins reaffirmed the
previous Executive163 Order and established a central domestic
partnership registry.
160. New York, N.Y., Admin. Code §§ 3-240 to -245 (Supp. 2003). The legislative
intent section of the provision provided the following statistics on usage of the
registry:
By the end of April 1998, there were approximately 8,700 couples registered
as domestic partners in New York City. More than 55% of those registered
domestic partners were heterosexual couples, and less than 45% were same
sex couples. Almost forty percent of registered domestic partnerships have
accessed City health benefits available to partners of City employees and
retirees.
Id. § 3-240, note.
161. In 1993, Mayor David Dinkins reaffirmed the previous executive order and
established a central domestic partnership registry. See Arthur S. Leonard, Mayor
Giuliani Proposes His Domestic Partnership Policy, 4 City Law 49, 51 (1998).
Notably, this new Executive Order liberalized the requirements by abandoning the
one-year continuous cohabitation requirement and replacing it with a requirement
that the couple only have cohabited for some (undefined) period of time. Id.
162. New York City Mayoral Exec. Order No. 123 (Aug. 7, 1989). The Executive
Order was issued one month after Braschi, see supra Part I.B.3.a., was decided. See
Leonard, supra note 161, at 51. Professor Leonard explains that, while Mayor Koch's
move was interpreted by some to be a political one to lure gay voters from his
Democratic Party opponent, then-Manhattan Borough President, David Dinkins,
Mayor Koch had consistently been a pro-gay advocate as a Congressman, as well as
earlier in his administration as Mayor. Id. In order to qualify as domestic partners,
(1) either both individuals had to be city residents or one individual had to be a city
employee; (2) both individuals had to be at least eighteen years of age; (3) neither
individual could be legally married; (4) the couple was required to have a close and
committed relationship showing mutual responsibility; (5) the couple must have lived
together for at least one year on a continuous basis at the time of registration; and (6)
the relationship must have been registered with the applicable city agency with which
they were employed. Id.
163. See Leonard, supra note 161, at 51. Most significantly, Mayor Dinkins, in
response to a settlement reached in Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education, 585
N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1992), that awarded health insurance benefits to the
domestic partners of the City's teachers, and extended such benefits to the domestic
partners of active and retired city employees. See Leonard, supra note 161, at 51. The
package matched exactly the benefits previously given solely to city employees'
spouses. Id. Settlement in Gay Teachers was reached after the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, denied defendant's summary judgment motion, referring
to Braschi when it gave deference to "the current state of the law regarding
discrimination in this area of family relationships" to come to its result. Gay Teachers,
585 N.Y.S.2d at 1016. One year later, Governor Mario Cuomo issued an Executive
Order giving health insurance coverage to the same-sex partners of non-union
managerial employees. See Leonard, supra note 161, at 52. He concurrently endorsed
such coverage for union employees working for the state by authorizing state agencies
to negotiate with their unions to provide the same benefits. See id.; see also AP
Political Serv., New Cuomo Plan Offers Insurance Benefits to "Significant Others,"
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The Domestic Partnership Law is more comprehensive than similar
registries in other jurisdictions in the scope of benefits and the degree
of obligations imposed on domestic partners. '16 In addition to health
insurance coverage, 65 the other unique benefits include an obligation
imposed on the City Clerk to ensure the confidentiality of the
registry166 and a right to receive a potential monetary award from the
Mayor if a domestic partner is a member of the fire department or
police force killed in the line of duty.167 One of the more significant
benefits-the inclusion of domestic partners in the definition of
"family" members under the Building
Code (codifying Braschi)-is a
168
confirmation of the prior Orders.
In August 2002, the New York City Council further extended the
reach of the registry by automatically recognizing as domestic partners
those same-sex couples who had already lawfully registered in other
jurisdictions their domestic partnerships, civil unions, or marriages. 6 9
Prior to this amendment, such couples that moved to New York City
faced a one-year waiting period to establish eligibility. 7 ' This
automatic recognition measure was intended to allow such couples to
instantly enjoy all the rights, benefits, and obligations available to
domestic partners already registered under New York City law. 7'
New York City's registry, however, has not been immune to
challenge.7
In Slattery v. City of New York, a group of taxpayers
challenged the registry on the grounds that it impermissibly legislated
in the area of marriage.'7 3 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, rejected this argument, holding that "defendant [New York]
City did not... impermissibly legislate in the area of marriage since
the provisions of the [Domestic Partnership Law] all relate to areas in
which the City has long and properly legislated and do not conflict
with State law or public policy., 174 It further held that the City had
Sept. 17, 1994, at 1, available at 1994 WL 3342928. This marked New York's first
statewide action benefiting same-sex couples that was not judicially created.
164. See Leonard, supra note 161, at 52.
165. New York, N.Y., Admin. Code § 12-307(c) (Supp. 2003).
166. Id. § 3-243.
167. Id. § 12-126(b)(2)(i).
168. Id. § 27-232.
169. Id. §§ 3-240(a), -245.
170. City Council Member Christine Quinn explained the effect of the amendment.
See
NYC Recognizes Gay Partnerships, cnn.com (Aug. 16 2002), at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/16/nyc.gay.partners/.
171. Id.
172. Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1999).
173. Id. at 604. For other examples, see generally supra note 102.
174. Slattery, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 604. A Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, among
others, has come to the opposite conclusion. Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 A.2d
980, 986 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) ("[W]e hold that the City did indeed act beyond the
scope of its power and contrary to [the state-enabling legislation] when it defined and
created for legal purposes a new relationship between same-sex persons that it
categorized as being part and parcel of the marital state.").
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the right to enter into healthcare plans and could, under Braschi,
define "family" expansively.'75 The court then rejected plaintiffs'
additional argument that the City had "transformed the domestic
partnership into a form of common law marriage" on the grounds that
the two are very different.'7 6
C. Post-September 11, 2001 Legislation
Part I.B.3. discussed how two of New York's greatest legal victories

for same-sex couples, while beneficial, only chipped away at the
broader number of disadvantages same-sex couples face. With this in
mind, the importance of New York's post-September 11, 2001
legislation is clear. Soon after September 11, 2001, federal and state
government hurriedly instituted legislation across all government
levels.'77 This section analyzes the legislation passed at the federal
level and the legislation passed in New York State, the site of the
World Trade Center attacks. At both levels, the legislation materially
departed from precedent.17 8
1. Federal Legislation
At the federal level, Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act'7 9 only eleven days after the September
11, 2001 attacks. This Act consists of a federal provision of monetary

assistance to the airline industry,8

the institution of new airline

security measures,"' and the creation of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001.18 Shortly thereafter, on October 26,
175. Slattery, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
176. Id. at 605.
177. For an overview of the federal legislation, and its place in tort and insurance
law, see Symposium, The Law and Economics of Providing Compensation for Harm
Caused by Terrorism, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 229 passim (2003), and Stephen P. Watters &
Joseph S. Lawder, The Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and Insurance, 29 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 809 (2003).
178. Private organizations also accounted for surviving same-sex partners. After
being notified by ESPA and other organizations of inconsistent relief awards to samesex partners of victims of September 11, 2001, the Red Cross formally issued a
statement that it would award family relief to same-sex partners and their children.
The Red Cross issued these instructions to its workers with a list of sixteen broad
factors, such as joint property ownership, joint leases, joint bank accounts, joint credit
cards, and utility bills including both individuals' names, that could be used to
determine whether an individual claiming to be a partner of a victim was eligible. See
Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, Red Cross Issues Guidelines on Relief
Assistance to Gay/Lesbian Survivors of September 11 (Dec. 4, 2001), at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-12-04-01.html.
179. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C §§ 40101 note,
44302-44306 (Supp. 2001)).
180. Id. §§ 101-107, 115 Stat. at 230-34.
181. Id. §§ 501-502, 115 Stat. at 241.
182. Id. §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. at 237-41; see infra Part II.C.l.a.; see also Marshall S.
Shapo, Compensationfor Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudenceof Injury, 36
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2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct

Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act") to punish terrorist
acts and enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. 183 On
November 19, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation

Security Act to establish under the Department of Transportation a
"Transportation

Security

Administration"

responsibility of improving aviation security. 1"4

tasked

with

the

Lastly, Congress

passed the Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety
Officers' Benefit Act of 2002, which compensates certain family
members of lost firefighters and police officers, including an
individual designated as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.185
Of all the federal legislation passed, the Federal Victims'
Compensation Fund most directly impacted the lives of same-sex

survivors of victims.
a. Federal Victims' Compensation Fund ("FVCF")
The FVCF was passed into law on September 22, 2001.186 The Act
is intended to insulate the airline industry from the financial fallout of
September 11, 200.187 Consequently, the FVCF authorizes monetary
awards on a case-by-case basis to the survivors of victims of
September 11, 2001188 in exchange for a release from all claims a
victim's estate may have against the airline industry.'8 9
The
Department of Justice was given authority to administer the FVCF
and, to that end, it named a "Special Master" to hear all individual
Ind. L. Rev. 237, 243 (2003) (describing the Fund as a "symbol of displaced vengeance
and a marker of social compassion").
183. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
184. Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified at scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
185. Pub. L. No. 107-196, 116 Stat. 719 (2002) (to be codified at scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
186. §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. at 237-41.
187. Id. § 101, 115 Stat. at 230 ("An Act [t]o preserve the continued viability of the
United States air transportation system.").
188. Id. § 406, 115 Stat. at 240. Those eligible for awards under the FVCF are (1)
the families of victims of the four flights and (2) persons injured or the families of
victims killed at any of the three crash sites. Id. § 405(c), 115 Stat. at 239-40. The
Washington Post reported that the first family to publicly accept its package under the
FVCF was awarded $1.04 million and, in the words of their attorney, accepted the
payout in lieu of legal action because they "wanted closure." Christine Haughney,
WTC Victim's Family Takes Compensation;FederalFund to Pay $1.04 Million, Wash.
Post, Aug. 9, 2002, at A3.
189. § 405(c)(3)(B), 115 Stat. at 240. If families sue, the airlines' liability is capped
at their respective insurance limits. Id. § 408(a), 115 Stat. at 239-40. If claimants opt
to bring suit, venue is limited to the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York. Id. § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241. Consequently, some families may feel
they have no choice but to acquiesce in submitting a claim to the FVCF.
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claims and establish by regulation the "procedural and substantive
rules" of the fund. 90 Accordingly, on March 13, 2002, the Special
Master issued interim rules, accepted comments on them, and then
issued the final rules, dictating how the fund would be administered.'
For those victims with wills naming a same-sex partner as the
executor of his or her estate, recovery should not be problematic as
the Special Master is obligated to recognize that person as the
"Personal Representative" representing the victim. 92 However, if the
victim died intestate, the Special Master must defer to the decedent's
domicile's intestacy laws. 93 The potential reliance on state intestacy
laws in determining the Personal Representative' 94 concerned
commentators from the beginning because it raised the question of
whether same-sex partners of victims would be left out. 195
From the beginning, advocates anticipated an inequitable
distribution, if any, to the same-sex partners of victims.196 In response
190. Id. § 404(a), 115 Stat. at 237-38.
191. 28 C.F.R. pt. 104 (2003). Under the FVCF, a victim is represented by a
"Personal Representative," who files a claim on her behalf. § 104.4(a). The Personal
Representative is determined in the following order: (1) an individual appointed by a
court to be the Personal Representative of the decedent or as the executor or
administrator of the decedent's will or estate; (2) where no Personal Representative
or executor or administrator has been appointed, the Special Master may choose the
person named in the decedent's will as the executor or administrator of the decedent's
estate; or (3) in the event no will exists, the Special Master may look to the laws of the
decedent's domicile governing intestacy. Id. Even if a same-sex partner has a
legitimate claim to be a Personal Representative, he or she is required to notify all
other potential Personal Representatives, including the victim's family members, of
his or her claim. Id. § 104.4(b). This notice requirement is highly problematic if a
victim's family opposed the relationship, see Knauer, supra note 23, at 64, or in the
event the victim never divorced a prior spouse. For such an example, see Gross,
supra note 15.
192. Further, the Personal Representative is distinct from the ultimate
beneficiary(ies) of the proceeds. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 60-61.
193. § 104.4(a).
194. See supra Part I.A.1. for a discussion of the treatment of same-sex couples
under state intestacy laws.
195. See Knauer, supra note 23, at 60-76. Unless the victim was a resident of
Vermont, Hawaii or California, a same-sex partner will not be an eligible recipient
under any state's law. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. The Special
Master also maintains apparent veto power over any Personal Representative's
distribution of an award. The Personal Representative is obligated to produce a
distribution plan to the Special Master prior to any such distribution and, "in the
event that the Special Master concludes that the Personal Representative's plan for
distribution does not appropriately compensate the victim's spouse, children, or other
relatives, the Special Master may direct the Personal Representative to distribute all
or part of the award to such spouse, children, or other relatives." § 104.52. Again, one
potentially knotty scenario is where the victim was not legally divorced and at the
time of her death had a same-sex partner, in which case the Special Master may, at his
discretion, opt to overturn or reduce an award to a same-sex partner in favor of the
spouse.
196. The non-recognition of same-sex partners is only one of many criticisms that
have surfaced with respect to the drafting and execution of the FVCF. The FVCF has
been criticized on the grounds that it was created to limit costs to the government, see
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to the initial Notice of Inquiry and Advanced Notice of Rulemaking
regarding the FVCF, a collective of gay rights advocates requested

that the Special Master recognize unmarried but committed same-sex
partners of victims.197 Gay rights advocates' fears were confirmed
when the Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, confirmed to the press
that he would not make payments to same-sex partners if they were

unrecognized under state intestacy laws.198

Fears were dispelled, however, when the FVCF made its first
documented award to the same-sex partner of a September 11, 2001
victim.199 The same-sex partner of a victim of the attack on the

Pentagon received a lump sum award of $557,390. She is a resident, as
was her partner, of Maryland, where the state's wrongful death statute
David W. Chen, Victims' Kin Find Fault with Overseer of 9/11 Fund, N.Y. Times, Nov.
13, 2002, at B1, and that the determination is performed by one person using flawed
criteria to determine compensation amounts which results in significantly diminished
payouts; see David W. Chen, A Slow, Deliberate Process of Judging 9/11 Victim
Awards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2003, at B1 ("He's like the Wizard of Oz." (quoting a
lawyer representing one family)).
197. The groups, including the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and ESPA, demanded
that "the Department... include among relatives eligible for compensation those
who lost their life partners or de facto parents or children, regardless of sexual
orientation and marital status." Letter from the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, Human
Rights Campaign, Empire State Pride Agenda, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders, National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, to the Department of Justice (Nov. 21, 2001), available at
The groups
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=919.
urged the Department to evaluate eligibility for an individual claiming compensation
based on a "family relationship of mutual interdependence." Id.
198. Mr. Feinberg said the following on Meet the Press on March 10, 2002:
[Gays and lesbians] are left out of my program to the extent that their own
state doesn't include them. I cannot get into a position in this program...
second-guessing [how] the state of New York or ... Massachusetts ... or
Virginia or New Jersey ... treat[s] same-sex partners, domestic live-ins, etc.
.... If your state law makes you eligible, I will honor state law. If it doesn't,
I go with the state.
Final Rule Comment R000201 (quoting Kenneth Feinberg), available at
(last visited
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/final/rmarl4/RO00201.html
Apr. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Comment R000201]. Thereafter, comments to the Final
Rule questioned Feinberg's comments and their rationale. See id.; Final Rule
at
available
R001399,
Comment
(last visited
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/final/rmar2l/R001399.html
Apr. 4, 2004). One comment noted that the government would award benefits to
illegal aliens, but would not consider awarding same-sex partners where the
applicable state law would be prohibitive. See id. Arguably, it was these comments
and the subsequent responses that helped propel Governor Pataki and the New York
State Legislature to amend its intestacy laws for the purpose of influencing Feinberg's
award-making decisions for New York State citizens. See infra note 231 and
accompanying text; see also Gross, supra note 15 ("In less clear-cut situations, Mr.
Feinberg added, he will take into account that New York's leaders, in a variety of
post-9/11 actions, 'have tried to improve the likelihood that I can exercise my
discretion and I will do my best."').
199. See Sheryl McCarthy, Still, a Small Priceto Pay for Lifetime Partner,Newsday,
Jan. 27, 2003, at A22; Steve Vogel, U.S. Awards Lesbian 9/11 Compensationfor Loss
of Partner,Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 2003, at B1.
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would not have recognized the relationship. Because the victim had
left a will granting everything to her partner, with her partner named
the executor of her estate, 200 application of Maryland's estates law
made the partner the beneficiary. While a great victory for same-sex
couples, the first award to a same-sex survivor does not diminish the
problems faced by couples without wills-a problem not applicable to
married couples who take under state intestacy laws.
b. Mychal Judge Police and Fire ChaplainsPublic Safety Officers'
Benefit Act of 2002
In June 2002, Congress passed the Mychal Judge Police and Fire
Chaplains Public Safety Officers' Benefit Act of 2002.201 The Act
authorizes the payment of $250,000 to the beneficiary named in a
police officer or firefighter's life insurance policy, provided there is no
surviving spouse or child.20 2 Mychal F. Judge was a gay Franciscan
Priest and Chaplain to the New York City Fire Department who was
Prior to the
killed during the September 11, 2001 attacks.20 3
legislation's passage, this federal payment was only authorized to the
spouse, children, or parents of the firefighter or police officer. The
amendment allows for payment to same-sex partners provided they
are the named beneficiary of the deceased under the insurance policy.
While the scope of the legislation is limited, it will apply to all future
police officers and firefighters, not just those who died on September
11, 2001. o
2. New York State Legislation
While New York City and, to a lesser degree, other municipalities
in New York State have been national leaders in the recognition and
support of same-sex couples, progress at the state level has been much
slower and less comprehensive.2 5 Indeed, it has been characterized as
200. See McCarthy, supra note 199.
201. Pub. L. No. 107-196, 116 Stat. 719 (2002) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711,
3796, 3796b).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 3796.
203. See Daniel J. Wakin, Killed on 9/11, Fire Chaplain Becomes Larger than Life,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2002, at Al. The legislation was criticized by the conservative
right. See Becker, supra note 46, at 230-31; Elisabeth Bumiller, Washington Memo;
The Most Unusual Story Behind a Gay Rights Victory, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2002, at
A25.
204. § 2(c), 116 Stat. at 720.
205. For example, a nondiscrimination law based on sexual orientation was passed
in New York in December 2002, more than thirty-one years after it was first proposed
in the state legislature. 2002 N.Y. Laws 2 (codified at N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(27), 296
(McKinney Supp. 2004)). While New York City has, arguably, been a municipal
leader for gay rights, a multitude of prejudices and other problems still exist. For one
discussion of gay rights in New York City before 9/11, see Symposium, Does New
York City Look Different to You? The Changing Legal Landscape of Queer New
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slow but steady."0 6 While same-sex couples won a few victories, they
remained generally disenfranchised. September 11, 2001 and the
legislation that followed, however, changed things significantly:
[I]t took September 11 for the New York State Legislature to finally
recognize [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender] relationships
and families .... These laws, the first of which included the term
"domestic partner" for the very first time in law in the history of
New York State, covered New York State's views on eligibility for
the 9/11 Federal Fund, Workers' Compensation benefits and
eligibility for college scholarships.2"7
Pronouncements like this demonstrate the importance of September
11, 2001 in recognizing the relationships of same-sex couples in New
York.
Shortly after New York passed legislation criminalizing certain
terrorist acts, New York introduced legislation aiding the September
11, 2001 victims' families and, in doing so, directly confronted the
historic precedent of ignoring same-sex couples in New York State's
laws.2 °8 Legislative change has come slowly-although steadily-in
New York; however, before September 11, 2001 the state had not
recognized "domestic partners" in any law.20 9 After September 11,
2001 that changed. Governor George Pataki issued fifty-six Executive
Orders in response to the terrorist attacks-all under an initial
Executive Order declaring a disaster emergency in New York.210 The
Executive Orders applicable to couples affected by the attacks
recognized and protected same-sex couples for the first time.
Legislation passed in New York-the home of the majority of the
victims"t ' -immediately concentrated on expanding the scope of the
York City, 26 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 139, 140 (2000-01) ("The question that
this panel is going to address today is, 'How queer friendly is New York City in the
current political landscape?' The answer seems to be that it depends on what type of
queer New Yorker you are.").
206. ESPA recently called the State's progress slow but steady, whereby it
"cobble[d] together a set of rights and responsibilities... [by] recogniz[ing] and
support[ing] families formed by lesbian and gay people... [t]hrough a jumble of
courts decisions, statutes, executive orders, policies, regulations and agency
interpretations." Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, Gay Families Winning
Legal
Protection
Incrementally
in NY
State
(Apr. 24, 2003),
at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-04-24-03.html.
207. Id. ESPA's Executive Director, Matt Foreman, went on to say that "While
the current patchwork of protections our families have won here in New York State is
clearly not enough, this progress proves that our quest for full equality is well
underway and will not be stopped." Id.
208. One man who had lost his partner summed up his status prior to the passage
of protections: "If you're straight and have a marriage license, it's one, two,
three .... We're clawing at it, just to be acknowledged." Lee, supra note 33.
209. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
210. Exec. Order No. 112.1,2001 N.Y. Laws 1185.
211. According to one estimate, 1,747 of the 2,996 victims were New York State
residents.
September
11,
2001
Victims
Website,
at
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state's Penal Law to encompass terrorist crimes. 2 1 2 In addition to
criminal legislation, the State Legislature quickly passed legislation
benefiting the families of the victims of September 11, 2001. It was
through these laws that New York took its greatest strides toward
recognizing same-sex couples.
a. Crime Victims Board Extended to Same-Sex Partners-A "Matter of
Grace"
New York State's first post-September 11, 2001 measure directed to
same-sex partners of victims of the tragedy was Governor Pataki's

issuance of an Executive Order on October 11, 2001 awarding
domestic partners the same standing as heterosexual spouses for

payments made to victims' families by the State Crime Victims
Board. 13

This was likely Governor Pataki's first of many other

actions benefiting domestic partners because of the short time frame
imposed upon victims' dependents to proffer evidence of loss and

eligibility for payment. Indeed, time was of the essence.
compensation acts provide governmental
Crime victims'
compensation to the families of crime victims to help them with the
out of-pocket costs and loss of earnings or support they suffer.21 4 New
York's version of this scheme states that its intent is to "aid, care [for]
'
and support ... as a matter of grace ... such victims of crime. "215
http://www.septemberl1victims.com/septemberl lvictims/country-citizenship.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
212. To that end, on September 17, 2001, New York State passed the AntiTerrorism Act of 2001, 2001 N.Y. Laws 300, which primarily amended the Penal Law
to include several terrorist crimes. N.Y. Penal Law § 490.00 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
On November 1, 2001, New York State Governor George Pataki and State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer proposed additional legislation that would primarily
supplement the Penal Law to account for further terrorist crimes. See Press Release,
Office of New York State Governor George Pataki, Governor Pataki, Attorney
General Spitzer Announce Comprehensive New Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Nov. 1,
2001), at http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/yearO1/novl 1_01.htm. The proposed
legislation later became the Terrorism Article in the New York Penal Code. N.Y.
Penal Law § 490 (McKinney Supp. 2004). "[T]he legislature finds that our laws must
be strengthened to ensure that terrorists, as well as those who solicit or provide
financial and other support to terrorists, are prosecuted and punished in state courts
with appropriate severity." Id.
213. 2001 N.Y. St. Reg., No. XXIII, at 85. The Executive Order amended the subsection of the Crime Victims Board Law that defined as eligible those claimants
considered to be a "dependent" of a deceased crime victim. N.Y. Exec. Law §
624(1)(c) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2004).
214. See generally Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Statutes Providing for
Governmental Compensation for Victims of Crime, 20 A.L.R.4th 63, 66-69 (1983).
The compensation is paid by government-appointed tribunals or boards that conduct
evidentiary hearings and determine the amount of payments-which are usually
capped by statute-made to claimants. See id.
215. N.Y. Exec. Law § 620 (McKinney 1996). The New York courts have made
clear, in at least one instance, that where the claimant cannot produce adequate
evidence of true economic loss, "[t]here is no legal right to be awarded the aid but
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Because same-sex partners were not explicitly named as potential
beneficiaries under the New York Crime Victims Board Law (prior to
the Executive Order or after the Executive Order), a partner
traditionally had to argue that he or she was a surviving spouse 216 or

another "person dependent for his principal support upon a victim of
crime who died as a direct result of such crime.

'217

While same-sex

partners had some success making these arguments, they nonetheless
had to resort to the courts to make a challenge, as opposed to spouses

who recovered automatically. 218 Today, however, that query is moot
due to the Executive Order.
Executive Order Number 113.30219 modified the Crime Victims
Board Law in two ways. First, it temporarily suspended the
dependent's requirement to show "principal support" on a victim,
provided the dependent demonstrate a unilateral dependence on the
victim or a mutual interdependence between them.2
Second, it

directed the Board to amend its definition of "principal support" from
seventy-five percent to fifty percent.22' While these changes do not
mention "same-sex partner," "domestic partner," "homosexual
partner" or any similar terminology, the Governor made clear in
comments to third parties that his intent in issuing the Order was to
use the same criteria for gay and lesbian survivors as is used for
rather, it is granted explicitly 'as a matter of grace."' Rigaud v. Crime Victims Comp.
Bd., 461 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (App. Div. 1983); see also Starkman v. Fischetti, 675
N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that monetary assistance is a matter of
grace).
216. § 624(1)(b).
217. Id. § 624(1)(c).
218. In one case where a partner argued he was a spouse, the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, in Secord v. Fischetti, 653 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1997),
declined to hold as unreasonable the Crime Victims Board decision that the term
"surviving spouse" does not extend to include a homosexual life partner. Id. at 552.
The petitioner also challenged the decision on the grounds that he fell into the
dependent spouse category. His claim was denied not on the ground of the sex of the
parties, but upon a determination that he had not received a "majority of his support"
from the deceased partner. Id. The court's willingness to make a determination based
on the parties' salaries and interdependent support was evidence that same-sex
partners were not completely precluded from recovery; however, their recovery was
not automatic under the "spouse" rule.
219. Exec. Order No. 113.30, 2001 N.Y. St. Reg., No. XXIII, at 85.
220. Id. The Order states that:
[Sluch dependent person shall be eligible for awards upon a showing of
unilateral dependence or mutual interdependence upon such a victim, which
may be evidenced by a nexus of factors, including but not limited to common
ownership of property, common householding, shared budgeting and the
length of the relationship between such person and the victim.
Id.
221. Id. In a New York Times article preceding the Executive Order, at least one
private organization ("Safe Horizon") said that it would make grants to otherwise
ineligible family members, including "a person whose domestic partner died in the
attack." Richard Prrez-Pefia, A Nation Challenged: The Clearinghouse; Service
Center Offers Help to the Victims of Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2001, at B10.
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spouses when determining payments to surviving partners of

September 11, 2001 victims.2 22 As a result of the Governor's action

same-sex and heterosexual unmarried partners became eligible-

without the prior economic support restraints-for up to six hundred
dollars per week with a cap of thirty thousand dollars.2 3 On October
17, 2002, the Crime Victims Board, with the support of Governor
Pataki, extended the previously issued Executive Order to all

qualifying partners (same-sex and opposite-sex) of homicide victims

going forward. 2 4 This extension exemplifies how a law specific to
September 11, 2001 spun into something greater, thereby providing
long-term benefits to same-sex couples.225
b. The September 11th Victims and FamiliesRelief Act
On May 21, 2002, New York passed the September 11th Victims
and Families Relief Act,226 which assists victims' survivors in seeking
relief and damages available to them under the FVCF. 227 Among
other things, it is intended to make New York State citizens who are
domestic partners of victims eligible for payments. Its first function is
to prohibit insurers or any other third-party payors from asserting
222. Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, Governor Pataki Speaks Out in
Support of SONDA (Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr10-16-01.htm. Governor Pataki went on to say, "There are things that are incredibly
important to us as a society and one of those things is our freedom and part of that
freedom is letting people live their lives as they deem appropriate, and not having
government tell them what to do." Id. While obviously not legally binding, the
Governor's explanation had a pragmatic benefit because it made clear that the
legislation was intended to benefit same-sex couples. It also stands as a symbolic
victory if in the future it is viewed as a signal of change. ESPA heralded the step,
noting that the order represents "the first official step taken by any level of
government in the nation to address the inequities faced by gay and lesbian survivors
of the terrorist attacks in obtaining benefits." See Press Release, Empire State Pride
Agenda, Gay Rights Organization Praises Governor Pataki for Order Granting Equal
Benefits to Gay Partners of those Killed in WTC Attacks (Oct. 12, 2001), at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-10-12-01.html.
223. N.Y. Exec. Law § 631(3) (McKinney Supp. 2004).
224. The effect of the extension was to "erase[] the 50% income dependency
requirement for gay partners and provide[] eligibility, just as it does for spouses,
regardless of the degree of their dependence on the deceased." See Press Release,
Empire State Pride Agenda, NY State Crime Victims Board Extends Equal Benefits
to Surviving Domestic Partners of Homicide Victims: Makes Governor Pataki's 9/11
at
17, 2002),
(Oct.
to
All Partners
Order
Applicable
Executive
Crime
[hereinafter
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-10-17-02.html
Victims Press Release].
225. ESPA claimed that "[o]nce the CVB... understood the damaging impact of
[its] policies on the lives of people who happened to be lesbian and gay and were
suffering like anyone else after 9/11, [it] understood the need [to] put in place a more
equitable approach to how financial assistance is provided." Id.
226. 2002 N.Y. Laws 73 (codified at N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 29, 1-b
(McKinney Supp. 2004)).
227. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified at scattered sections of
U.S.C.). For a discussion of the FVCF, see supra Part I.C.l.a.
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liens on awards made under the FVCF, or reducing any payouts based

upon a beneficiary's claim from the FVCF.2 28 Second, it insulates the

personal representative (as defined in the FVCF) of a victim from
liability if exercising good faith steps in connection with deciding
whether to make a claim and, if so, in making that claim. 229 Lastly, it
makes awards under the FVCF in New York State tax-exempt.23° Of
most significance to same-sex partners of September 11, 2001 victims,

the "Legislative intent" provision in the Act states that the Special
Master of the FVCF, who is required thereunder to look to the
victim's state's intestacy laws to determine who is eligible for relief,
should make eligible those New York State citizens who are domestic
231
partners of victims.

In its memorandum in support of passage of the bill, the New York
State Senate claimed: "[t]his legislation does not make any changes to
New York State law on this issue, because [the federal Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act] and the
implementing regulations already indicate that the domestic partners

are eligible to receive compensation from the Fund.2132 However, the

FVCF neither explicitly indicates that domestic partners are eligible,
nor was its silence on the issue ever reasonably interpreted to mean
that domestic partners would be covered. 33 Consequently, the Senate

stretches somewhat its argument when, with the purpose of
supporting its contention, it notes that the rationale behind the Fund
is to compensate "relatives" of the deceased,23 ' and that the legislative
228. N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 29, 1-b.
229. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-4.7(e) (McKinney Supp. 2004).
230. 2002 N.Y. Laws 73, § 7.
231. Id. at § 1. The provision states:
[T]hat domestic partners of victims of the terrorist attacks are eligible for
distributions from the federal victim compensation fund, and the
requirements for awards under the New York State World Trade Center
Relief Fund and other existing state laws, regulations, and executive orders
should guide the federal special master in determining awards and ensuring
that the distribution plan compensates such domestic partners for the losses
they sustained.
Id. In a press release, ESPA explained the source of the intent section:
This language is the result of extensive negotiations between the Attorney
General's and the Governor's offices with the Empire State Pride Agenda in
consultation with Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. The Pride
Agenda hopes that this provision will help give Special Master Kenneth
Feinberg an additional basis in law to distribute federal fund awards to
surviving same-sex partners living [in] New York State.
Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, New York State's Leadership Introduces
Joint Bill that Takes Additional Steps Supporting Family Members of 9/11 Victims
(May
2,
2002),
at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-5-1-02.html
[hereinafter Joint Bill Press Release].
232. Senate Memorandum in Support, 2002 N.Y. Laws 73, at 1710.
233. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing Special Master
Kenneth Feinberg's response to requests that the FVCF be eligible to same-sex
partners of victims).
234. Senate Memorandum in Support, 2002 N.Y. Laws 73, at 1710.
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history's references to "families" of victims are surreptitious allusions
to domestic partners.2 35 The Senate's subsequent support for the Act

is more persuasive where it cites the codification of Braschi and
Executive Order 113.30:

"New York State has indicated in several

contexts that individuals in committed relationships are considered to

be 'family members."'2 36 This statement is more decisive proof that
New York intended to build on prior recognition of same-sex couples
by including them under the FVCF.
c. World Trade Center Memorial Scholarship Program

On September 21, 2001, Governor Pataki issued Executive Order
No. 113.21, directing the Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York and the City University of New York to establish

scholarship programs to the "innocent victims, and the spouses and
children of the innocent victims," of September 11, 2001.237 The
Order did not include "domestic partners," "financial dependents," or
the like. However, on September 23, 2002, Governor Pataki signed
23
into law the World Trade Center Memorial Scholarship Program,
which granted scholarships to a varied class of people affected by
September 11, 2001, including those who were "financial
dependent[s]" of victims. 239 A financial dependent is defined as
someone who can show unilateral or mutual interdependence upon a
victim, which may be evidenced by criteria seen in the preceding
laws.2 4 This definition uses the same indicia to determine a financial
dependent as used in Executive Order 113.30241 as well as the 2002
amendment to New York's workers' compensation law.242 The
235. Id.
236. Id. ESPA argued that the intent language was important because Special
Master Feinberg was required to defer to state law in making his determination of
awards and Special Master Feinberg has been encouraged "to read this language as a
clear signal that as far as New York is concerned all who have lost a loved one on
September 11 have suffered equally and should therefore be treated equally." See
Joint Bill Press Release, supra note 231. ESPA noted that of the twenty-one known
surviving lesbian and gay partners of victims of September 11, eleven lived in New
York State and, consequently, could benefit from the provision. Id. While happy that
progress was made, ESPA was frustrated that these benefits were limited to one class
of people: "While we are disappointed that government has failed to pass legislation
that [has] been submitted this year and in year's past that puts in place permanent
changes in law for same-sex partners ....We recognize that this is at least a small but
important step forward." Id.
237. Exec. Order No. 113.21, 2001 N.Y. Laws 1202.
238. 2002 N.Y. Laws 176 (codified at N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 601(5)(6)(7), 608, 668-b, d (McKinney Supp. 2004)).
239. N.Y. Educ. Law § 601(7).
240. Id. The criteria are comprised of "a nexus of factors, including but not limited
to common ownership of property, common householding, shared budgeting and the
length of the relationship between the financial dependent and such individual." Id.
241. See text accompanying supra note 219.
242. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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consistent use of the definition in the Executive Orders, which builds

upon similar definitions already established in New York law
governing family members' succession rights to apartments,243
evidences New York's evolution in broadening its definition of
families to include same-sex couples.
d. Workers' CompensationAmendment

In response to the legal challenge made by Larry Courtney, the
same-sex partner of a victim, 2 " the New York State Assembly and
Senate unanimously passed an amendment to the State Workers'
Compensation Law making the "domestic partners" of September
11,
245

Of
2001 victims eligible for workers' compensation benefits.
greatest significance to the same-sex partners of victims, this law
expressly defines a "domestic partner" as eligible,246 rather than using

the term "financial dependent," which was used in some of the

preceding laws and Executive Orders. 24 7 The law defines a "domestic

partner" as (1) an individual who is registered as the domestic partner
of a victim with an employer or municipality or (2) a dependent of a
victim who can demonstrate: "unilateral dependence or mutual
interdependence, as evidenced by a nexus of factors including, but not
limited to, common ownership of real or personal property, common
householding, children in common, signs of intent to marry, shared
budgeting, and the length of the personal relationship with the
employee. ' 24 8 This recognition of "domestic partners" represents the

most significant step taken by New York State in its post-September
11, 2001 lawmaking.

Generally, workers' compensation statutes obligate employers to
compensate their employees for certain injuries suffered on the job,
regardless of fault.249 Prior to its amendment, New York Workers'

243. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2520.6(o)(2) (2001).
244. See supra notes 1, 5-6 and accompanying text.
245. 2002 N.Y. Laws 467 (codified at N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 4 (McKinney
Supp. 2004)).
246. N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 4(1). The definition of "domestic partner" used
in Chapter 467 is identical to the one used in Chapter 468, a law passed on August 20,
2002 with the purpose of compensating the "domestic partners" of firefighters killed
on September 11, 2001. 2002 N.Y. Laws 468. Specifically, the law grants to a named
class of deceased firefighters' "domestic partners" the same special accidental death
benefit previously payable only to spouses. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 208-f (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 2004).
247. See text accompanying supra notes 220, 23940.
248. N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 4(1).
249. See generally 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation § 1 (2003). The statutes
set forth the damages payable to employees injured on the job as well as the hierarchy
of eligible beneficiaries in the event of death-in which case, "death benefits" are
distributed. See, e.g., N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 16 (McKinney 1993).
These benefits also include certain funeral expenses, the cost of which are to be
determined by the Workers' Compensation board. Id. § 16 (1).
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Compensation Law paid out death benefits to a decedent's spouse and
children 250 and, in the event neither existed, payment went to parents,
grandparents, and brothers and sisters under the age of eighteen,
provided they could prove dependency. 1 In the event there were no
such beneficiaries, the award went to the estate.252 Committed samesex partners are absent from this list. Because workers' compensation
statutes are designed to act as an economic safety cushion for
individuals financially dependent on a victim, 3 their intent is stymied
when a same-sex partner-dependent on a victim as if the2 4victim were
his or her spouse-is not considered eligible for recovery. 1
For New York State citizens who lost same-sex partners on
September 11, 2001, their recovery is now automatic, provided they
were registered in a domestic partnership registry (of any kind), or
can evidence the requisite unilateral or mutual interdependence, and
provided they do not have a legal spouse from a prior marriage.25 5
The payout amount depends on the decedent's salary and can be as
high as $20,800 per year, and continues in perpetuity.256 Needless to
say, the pecuniary benefit to a widow or widower is significant.
Despite this tremendous victory, Larry Courtney later articulated
the problem that seemed apparent to many: Why should such
treatment be limited to such a small group of victims when other
250. Id. § 16(1)-(3). In all of the payment scenarios, dependent children are
defined as children under the age of eighteen, or, if a full-time student, under the age
of twenty-three, regardless of whether they were supported by the decedent. Id.
251. Id. § 16(4).
252. Id. § 16(4)-b.
253. See Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 249, at § 5.
254. Other jurisdictions do, however, interpret the "dependency" requirement
more liberally. For example, in California, the dividing line for dependency is not cut
along blood lines, but, rather, along a "good faith" family member standard: "No
person is a dependent of any deceased employee unless in good faith a member of the
family or household of the employee, or unless the person bears to the employee the
relation of husband or wife, child, posthumous child, adopted child or stepchild,
grandchild...." Cal. Lab. Code § 3503 (West 2003). Thus, a woman living in a
committed relationship-as evidenced by the joint occupation of a residency, the
pooling of individual assets and use of joint bank accounts-with a man who had not
divorced her husband with whom she no longer lived, is considered a "good faith"
family member. See Dep't of Indus. Relations v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 156
Cal. Rptr. 183, 187 (Ct. App. 1979). However, dependency is not established, per se,
when same-sex couples occupy the same residence. When two men live together but
evidence is not proffered to illuminate a financial dependency between the two,
dependency does not lie. See Donovan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 187 Cal.
Rptr. 869, 873 (Ct. App. 1982) ("Merely because two persons of the same sex occupy
a single residential structure does not dictate either the sexual influences or
dependency within the meaning of the code. It is necessary however for the Board to
determine the primal issue of dependency status made to a petitioner.").
255. Realistically, this second requirement can be problematic for those who never
legally divorced prior spouses. For an example, see Gross, supra note 15.
256. See Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, State Legislature Approves
Workers Compensation Benefits for 9/11 Same-Sex Survivors (June 26, 2002), at
http://www.prideagenda.org./pressreleases/pr-6-26-02.html.
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same-sex couples are denied these benefits everyday? He said: "This
is good for some of us, but we have to do more for all of us. People
whose partners died in other tragedies on the job are still fighting with
insurance companies for the basic benefits that were intended for
families in our situation. 2 57 This question applies not only to
workers' compensation but other types of financial support, such as
survivor benefits.
D. Post-September 11, 2001 Debate Exposes the Conflict Over the
Legal Treatment of Same-Sex Couples
This section describes how commentators for and against the postSeptember 11, 2001 lawmaking responded. The differences in opinion
demonstrate that some people applauded the laws while others
assailed them, claiming they are the result of opportunistic individuals
pushing an "agenda" that has gone too far.
Among the media coverage surrounding the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks were the disclosures of personal stories of same-sex
couples affected by the tragedy. Through the media stories of gay and
lesbian couples surfaced-and the resulting legislation affecting
them-that many citizens had never seen or heard before: "Together
these efforts and advances spotlighted for the nation the institutional
difficulties lesbian and gay families face living their lives on a daily
basis and re-ignited the debate over the need for relationship
recognition by government of families headed by same-sex
partners."25' 8 The foregoing quote is illustrative of the possibility that
September 11, 2001 gave many people their first exposure to the
reality of same-sex couples' lives and the hardships they face when
marriage-based rights are absent. Such awareness "re-ignited" the
debate over same-sex couples' legal recognition. Further,
The tragedy of Sept. 11 .... affirmed some trends and traits that are
sources of pride, while.., also... discovering and facing others that
reveal our fragility and intolerance. Nowhere is this more evident
than with our humane, yet controversial, treatment of gay men and
lesbians who lost partners on that horrible day.259
The idea that people "discovered" the existence of same-sex
couples and gay and lesbian victims for the first time after September
11, 2001 was not uncommon.2 6 Past isolated events often have raised
257. Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, supra note 6.
258. See Crime Victims Press Release, supra note 224; see also Hank Stuever, The
Bomb with a Loaded Message: For Gays in America, Even Heroism Isn't a Ticket to
Inclusion, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 2001, at C1 ("We're not in 'Leave It to Beaver' land
anymore. There are all kinds of families who don't fit the government's definition of
family, who need help and won't be able to get it.").
259. Bill Maxwell, Gay Survivors of the Sept. 11 Tragedy Deserve Death Benefits,
St. Petersburg Times, June 2, 2002, at 1D (emphasis added).
260. See Evelyn Nieves, Passengeron Jet: Gay Hero or Hero Who Was Gay?, N.Y.
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the recognition of same-sex couples and the difficulties they face.
These isolated events, however, rarely gain critical mass and more
often lead to ad hoc court judgments and lawmaking that aid same-sex
couples, albeit in a very discrete sense.2 61 The legislative response to
September 11, 2001 was recognized as a departure.262
Media coverage was not limited to those in support of extending
civil rights to same-sex couples; commentators arguing against the
recognition of same-sex couples were numerous. Louis Sheldon, the
founder and chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, said that
neither the government nor private relief agencies should have
provided assistance to the same-sex partners of September 11, 2001
victims. He claimed that, with respect to gay rights organizations
lobbying for aid, "[t]hey are taking advantage of this national tragedy
to promote their agenda, 2 63 that private relief groups "should be first
giving priority to those widows who were at home with their babies
and those widowers who lost their wives"2 6 and that "assistance
should be given on the basis and priority of one man and one woman
in a marital relationship. '265 He went on to state that gay rights
organizations were using the tragedy to redefine marriage.26 6 Rev.
Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson assessed blame for the attacks on,
among others, gays and lesbians: "I really believe that the ... gays
and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative
lifestyle ... all of them who have tried to secularize America, I point
the finger in their face and say, 'You helped this happen.' '' 267 These
Times, Jan. 16, 2002, at A12 ("Maybe because of the lack of visible heroes for us,
there's a greater significance in finding heroes.").
261. The Empire State Pride Agenda supports this theory. See Empire State Pride
Agenda, State of the State Report 2003, at 13-16 (2003), available at
http://www.prideagenda.org/stateofstate/2003/legalstatus.pdf.
262. See Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture, and Family: The Transformative Power of
Culture and the Limits of Law, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 785 (2003). Professor Nancy E.
Dowd argued:
Our response to 9/11, it seems to me, has been to embrace all who have lost
and thereby to embrace the most fluid, flexible, relational view of family. It
is a definition of family founded in love and emotion, acts and history, rather
than status or formality. At least on this occasion, we have forgotten our
objections to nontraditional families and embraced a definition of family
based on emotional connection.
Perhaps we have witnessed a
transformation.
Id. at 799.
263. Thomas B. Edsall, Minister Says Gays Should Not Get Aid, Wash. Post, Oct. 5,
2001, at A22.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. Two days after the attacks Reverend Pat Robertson asserted that an
"angry God" had allowed the terrorists to succeed because, among other reasons he
proposed, the United States had become a nation of abortion, homosexuality, secular
schools and courts, and the American Civil Liberties Union. See Nieves, supra note
260.
267. Laurie Goodstein, After the Attacks: Finding Fault; Falwell's Finger-Pointing
Inappropriate,Bush Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2001, at A15. Jerry Falwell later
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remarks illuminate both the recognition of what was happening to
same-sex couples and the debate that ensued.2 6s They elucidate the
conflict between prior non-recognition and the new shift in treatment
that enflamed Sheldon and others.
While gay rights groups' declarations of success, Governor Pataki's
remarks and issuance of Executive Orders, 269 and the antagonistic
remarks by certain members of the Christian right create a perception
of substantial change, they are not conclusive. New York's legislation,
however, is facially demonstrative of change because certain civil
rights plainly did not exist for
same-sex couples before September 11,
27 0
2001 but existed afterward.

II. STORYTELLING AND SOCIAL CHANGE
In Part I, this Comment outlined the general legal treatment of
same-sex couples with an emphasis on such treatment in New York,
including the treatment of the same-sex survivors of victims of
September 11, 2001. The legislative events following September 11,
2001 exposed the need for change as existing laws confronted the
modern realities of committed same-sex relationships.
Change
seemed to come relatively easily after years of obstinence from both
the courts and legislators, albeit in a limited form directed toward a
discrete number of people. While relatively limited, the change has
been heralded as indisputably unique and politically successful, as
same-sex surviving partners gained rights they were never privy to
before. 271 These reforms in the legal treatment of same-sex couples
raise the question of how September 11, 2001 affected lawmakers to
spur them to act as they did. Were their views of same-sex couples
fundamentally altered? The reforms also beg the question of what
their long-term effects will be. Will history look back on the events as
a footnote in the gay rights struggle, or as a significant turning point?
Part II.A. discusses how storytelling is used by legal commentators
and practitioners to air the voices of disenfranchised groups.
Storytelling is a tool that attempts to use the personal narratives of
disenfranchised groups to provide a different perspective on the more
dominant narratives inherent in the law.272 Scholars argue that law is
apologized for his remarks. See Gustav Niebuhr, A Nation Challenged: Placing
Blame; Falwell Apologizes for Saying an Angry God Allowed Attacks, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 2001, at B4.
268. The debate did not cease after 9/11. As of September 2003, governmental
officials-largely from the Republican Party-have proposed a constitutional
amendment that would define "marriage" as a relationship solely between a man and

a woman. See infra note 467.
269. See supra note 222.
270. See supra Part I.C.2.
271. See supra Part I.C.2.
272. See generally Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories,
63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionistsand
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inherently narrative but that often only dominant "ingroup"
narratives are heard.2 13 Consequently, scholars call for non-dominant
"outgroups" to embrace their own narratives to bring their voices to
the forefront. 27 4 By doing so, storytelling can act as a tool to build
community within outgroups, and as a method by which to enlighten
and persuade others as to outgroups' experiences. 27 5 Storytelling is a
particularly powerful tool for same-sex couples, as they must tell their
own stories to counter established and homophobic narratives.27 6 The
events of September 11, 2001 itself told many stories, including those
of same-sex couples affected by the tragedy. Individuals, too, spoke
out and articulated narratives that exposed the realities and hardships
same-sex couples endure. These narratives played a role in the
lawmaking that followed. Part II.B. introduces frameworks used by
social scientists to evaluate how social change occurs. The literature
explores the role of discrete events and how they often act as
opportunities for a social movement to progress and change public
opinion. September 11, 2001 is analogous to the types of events that
sparked progress for other social movements in the past.
Consequently, this literature provides a lens through which to
evaluate the potential implications of September 11, 2001 on the legal
treatment of same-sex couples.
A. Storytelling
1. Outgroups' Use of Storytelling
Storytelling refers to the use of personal narrative to communicate
a non-dominant perspective of the law. 277 At its core, storytelling
premises that the law's presumed objectivity and impartiality is
illusory.27 8 Proponents of storytelling argue that the law actually
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411 (1988); Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987) (arguing that storytelling can
induce empathy).
273. See Coombs, supra note 272, at 683-89 (arguing that traditional scholarship
itself is what has spurred the creation of outsider scholarship); Delgado, supra note
272, at 2412-13, (dominant narratives "are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time").
274. See Coombs, supra note 272, at 683-89; Delgado, supra note 272, at 2412-16.
275. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U.
Miami L. Rev. 511, 516-22 (1992) (arguing that storytelling has an "inclusive" and
"persuasive" function).
276. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1994)
(using examples of homosexuals in the military to demonstrate the value of
storytelling); Fajer, supra note 275, at 516-22.
277. See generally Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations,22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1987) (calling for the adoption
of unheard voices by "looking to the bottom"); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989).
278. See Coombs, supra note 272, at 684-85.

2866

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

reflects a dominant majority vision that ignores the voices of
traditionally marginalized groups, or "outgroups.2' ' 7 9 Consequently,
what is perceived as normal or institutional is in reality a reflection of
the elite's perspective and biases, which inherently ignores the
The effect of "ingroup"
realities of outgroups' experiences.
to
the voices of others. Its
impervious
dominance is a legal system
that "social reality is
If
you
believe
dominance can lead to oppression.
' 280
do,
the danger is clear.
of
storytelling
as proponents
constructed,
Individuals unknowingly believe that one particular set of narratives
Most
and experiences is reflective of experiences globally.2 1
importantly, laws are created and interpreted through this assumed
neutrality; in reality, the law is actually informed by subtle and more
overt prejudices.282
Given this paradigm: "The attraction of stories for ... [out]groups
should come as no surprise. ' 28 3 Through storytelling, outgroups are
able to both voice their stories and alternative perspectives "to
subvert [commonly accepted legal] realit[ies]." ' 81 Proponents of
storytelling contend that legal "objectivity" is an impossibility. They
believe that the law is subjective and needs to be recognized as such.
More importantly, outsider groups should embrace their own voices in
order to posit themselves as antithetical to what is normative or
accepted in the law and legal scholarship.285
Storytelling has two primary benefits. First, it allows outgroup
members to strengthen themselves and build community by
articulating what is common between them.28 6 When outgroup
members hear common stories from their peers, it strengthens their
community. In addition, they begin to create and realize their own
history.28 7 Second, storytelling has the ability to persuade ingroups,
and other individuals who are normally blind to what outgroups have
to say, to become more empathetic. 28 By articulating a rarely heard
voice, storytelling gives the establishment an insight into the particular
outgroup's experience. Once a dominant ingroup understands that
279. See Delgado, supra note 272, at 2412. Similarly, storytelling has been
characterized as "outsider scholarship" contrasted against traditional scholarship. See
Coombs, supra note 272, at 684-85. The majority has been characterized as a group of
legal elites who are overwhelmingly white and male. See Eskridge, supra note 276, at
607.
280. See Delgado, supra note 272, at 2416.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 2413; Lin, supra note 22, at 746.
283. See Delgado, supra note 272, at 2412.
284. See id. at 2413.
285. See Coombs, supra note 272, at 684-85.
286. See Delgado, supra note 272, at 2414-15; Fajer, supra note 275, at 516-20.
287. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 517-18.
288. See id. at 521-22; Lin, supra note 22, at 749-50 ("The persuasive storyteller
uses the story as a tool to illustrate abstract points and to evoke empathy from the
listeners, in hopes of promoting a greater understanding of lesbian and gay culture.").
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differing experiences exist, and then listens to them, the ingroup may
be able to change its ways. Storytelling thus allows outgroups to
persuade, change mindsets and chip away at prejudices.28 9 The stakes
are high because the power to persuade will impact how laws are
created and interpreted. Indeed, it is the province of "common law
judges [to] create abstract rules based on evaluation of individual
29 It is no surprise, then, that storytelling has been embraced
stories.""
by outgroups
and other political minorities challenging the status
291
quo.
Critical legal theorists and feminist scholars have embraced the use
of storytelling to theorize that outside voices-particularly those of
women and/or people of color-have been traditionally left out of
legal discourse.292 Outsiders argue that legal elites are comprised
primarily of white heterosexual men. Moreover, because "[l]egal
scholarship is inevitably narrative,"29' 3 scholars doubt whether such
294
elites' stories "reflect social consensus or neutral values.
Narratives from the outside, which are infused with personal
experiences and stories that "look[] to the bottom, '" 91 provide a new
lens through which to understand the law.296 Storytelling is thus a
political act used to raise consciousness within outgroups. At the
same time, it persuades ingroup members to alter their views.297
Storytelling's applicability to gays and lesbians is clear. The
traditional mistreatment of gays and lesbians warrants its application.
Moreover, its potential to alter attitudes about gays and lesbians is
strong. Indeed, gay and lesbian activists have embraced the use of
storytelling in numerous ways and contexts. 98
2. The Importance of Storytelling to Same-Sex Couples
Gays and lesbians are arguably the most disenfranchised of the
disenfranchised, often discriminated against by groups who
themselves are victims of discrimination.2 99
This historic
discrimination has resulted in the exclusion of gays and lesbians from
many of the rights and privileges that others enjoy under the law.3 °°
289. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 521-22.
290. Id. at 521.
291. See Coombs, supra note 272, at 686-89.
292. Id. at 685-86.
293. Eskridge, supra note 276, at 607.
294. Id. at 608; see also Lin, supra note 22, at 746.
295. Matsuda, supra note 277, at 324.
296. See Eskridge, supra note 276, at 608; Lin, supra note 22, at 746.
297. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 276, at 614.
298. See, e.g., id. at 607-09; see also infra Part II.A.2.
299. See Lin, supra note 22, at 748 (citing Frank Browning, The Culture of Desire:
Paradox and Perversity in Gay Lives Today 4 (1993)).
300. See id. at 751-58 (recounting the historic exclusion of gays and lesbians and
anti-gay rhetoric).
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The inability to marry,3" 1 and often times to adopt children,3 2 are both
clear examples of this exclusion. Legal scholars have argued that such
exclusions are rooted in a deep history of stereotyping and reliance on
false "understandings" about the lives of gays and lesbians and their
relationships.303
Gays and lesbians have been excluded in large part because courts
and lawmakers' "understanding" of gays and lesbians has consistently
relied on narratives grounded in animus and misconception. 3°4 An
individual's "understanding" of same-sex relationships often amounts
to nothing more than a caricatured stereotype based on "preunderstanding."30 ' The term "pre-understanding" has been used to
refer to the scheme of beliefs a listener-particularly an ingroup
member-has prior to actually hearing an outgroup member's story.30 6
Pre-understanding is damaging because, in effect, the listener
supplants the speaker's words with his or her own.3 7
Preunderstanding of gay and lesbian relationships arises in a wide range
of scenarios, including assertions that gay men and lesbians are not
and/or cannot be members of the armed forces,308 that sexual activity
defines being gay and precludes monogamy and child rearing,3 9 that
homosexuals "flaunt" their sexuality,310 and that homosexuals embody
characteristics of the other gender.3 As harmful as reliance on preunderstanding may be generally, damage stemming from the courts'
and lawmakers' reliance on certain pre-understandings is arguably
worse.
Courts use their own narratives, which have important effects:
"Courts must be cognizant that their decisions generate a narrative
that dictates, to a large extent, social norms. 31 2 Unfortunately, courts
have traditionally used their own dominant-and false-narratives to
disenfranchise gay men and lesbians.313 For example, the courts'
301. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
302. See Lin, supra note 22, at 768-69.
303. See id. at 768-81. See generally Larry CatO Backer, Constructing a
"Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and
Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 529 (1996).
304. Backer, supra note 303, at 539 ("Traditionally, courts in the United States and
Great Britain have had an extraordinarily difficult time dealing empathetically or
intelligently with issues relating to the criminal regulation of sexual nonconformity
(particularly adult, noncoercive sexual activity) . .. [including] cases which directly
involve those quintessential sexual nonconformists-gay men and lesbians.")
305. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 524-25 (citation omitted).
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See Eskridge, supra note 276, at 614-15.
309. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 537-46. Professor Fajer coins this phenomenon
the "sex-as-lifestyle assumption." Id. at 537.
310. See id. at 571-91.
311. See id. at 607-24.
312. See Lin, supra note 22, at 766.
313. See generally Backer, supra note 303.
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narratives in sexual conduct cases have created a jurisprudence
brimming with stock narratives of homosexual men as "mythological
figures of disgust."314 The result is that:
[flor judges telling stories, and hearing stories in cases on a daily
basis and over a number of years, the mass of this narrative makes it
easy to believe that sexual nonconformists are almost invariably
disgusting in some basic way... [and315are] invariably linked to
predator, pied piper, whore, and defileT.
316 which
A prime example of this stereotype is Bowers v. Hardwick,
has been heavily criticized for taking a blind eye to the actual facts of
the case and simply relying on stock stories about gay men.317 Indeed,
commentators have lambasted Bowers for failing to view the
defendant as a human being at all.31
Another example of a damaging narrative takes place in the context
of gays in the military. Professor William Eskridge has discussed the
use of narrative in the context of the U.S. government's creation of its
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.31 9 In congressional hearings that
contemplated lifting the military's ban on homosexuals, gay men and
lesbians were characterized as "selfish and sexually predatory,"
attributes that individuals claimed should preclude them from military
service. 320 These stock characterizations, though, flew directly in the
face of personal narratives that told a different story.32' One Army
Colonel testified that he had always worked with "excellent"
homosexual soldiers, and that he had never witnessed any predatory
behavior.3 22 Such a narrative can be very compelling because it forces
ingroup members to test their baseless, abstract propositions (i.e., preunderstandings) against concrete cases.3 23 Discriminatory narratives,
then, have historically infringed the rights of gays and lesbians.
Clearly, gays and lesbians will benefit from replacing those narratives
with their own.
Like other outgroups, gays and lesbians have begun to utilize
storytelling to build community and persuade ingroups to depart from
common perceptions and cease their proclivity to stereotype.324

314. Id. at 531.
315. Id. at 567.
316. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
317. See Henderson, supra note 272, at 1638-49 (detailing the background and legal
arguments used in Bowers).
318. See, e.g., id. at 1642.
319. See Eskridge, supra note 276, at 614-15.
320. Id. at 615.
321. See id.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 615-16 (describing the story of a fifteen-year veteran who was
"hounded out of the military").
324. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 517-20.
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Community-building is particularly important to the gay and lesbian
community because of the effects of the closet. 2 The closet has a
silencing effect on gay men and lesbians that precludes them from
voicing their sexual orientation to others.326 Hearing the coming out
stories of others can help gay men and lesbians living in the closet to
come out themselves and, thereafter, build solidarity from others'
stories.327
Storytelling for persuasive purposes centers on the ability to
subjectively and artfully shape and articulate a legal argument based
on a certain factual situation. The narrative used is as important as
the underlying argument itself: "[T]he key to achieving gay rights
may lie not in the substance of the legal arguments, but in the way
they are presented. 3 2 Presentation through storytelling allows the
speaker to voice emotion, something that has been traditionally
understood to be distinct from the law. A dichotomous approach to
the law that views reason and emotion as separate is fundamentally
flawed because it assumes emotion must play no part in thinking
"legally":
The avoidance of emotion, affect, and experiential understanding
reflects an impoverished view of reason and understanding... [that]
stems from a belief that reason and emotion are separate, that
reason can and must restrain emotion, that law-as-reason can and
must order, rationalize, and control.329
Consequently, storytelling can be persuasive because it allows a
speaker to bring a human element to an otherwise abstract legal
argument. 330 The human side of a story creates a "common emotive
ground" between the speaker and listener that can spur empathy. 331
At a more basic level, storytelling for gays and lesbians has
"informational value" because it reminds the unaware or bigoted that
gays and lesbians exist. 332 When ingroups are reminded of gays and
325. See id. at 535.
326. See id. at 591-602.
327. See id.; see also Lin, supra note 22, at 748-49.
328. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 513. Professor Gerald P. L6pez has argued that
because we think about social interaction in story form, we inherently rely on "stock
stories." Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 3 (1984) (citation
omitted). Because individuals have limited information, stock stories allow us to
make decisions more efficiently. They allow us to carry on our interactions with
others "without constantly having to analyze" our thoughts. Id. The lawyer's
challenge is to recognize how people use stock stories and then learn how to
manipulate them to one's advantage: "To solve a problem through persuasion of
another, we therefore must understand and manipulate the stock stories the other
person uses in order to tell a plausible and compelling story-one that moves that
person to grant the remedy we want." Id.
329. See Henderson, supra note 272, at 1575-76.
330. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 521-22.
331. Id. at 521.
332. See Eskridge, supra note 276, at 614.
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lesbians' existence and, more importantly, their inequitable treatment
under the law, it becomes more difficult for ingroups to deny the costs
of their policies.333
Lawmakers' responses to September 11, 2001 reflect the strong
informational value of storytelling. The public, including legislators,
heard powerful stories that humanized individuals' losses.33 4 For
example, Larry Courtney articulated to the public that despite living
in a committed relationship with his partner for more than thirteen
years, their relationship did not count as far as New York State was
concerned.3 As legal scholars have argued, the true and human side
of a story often leads an ingroup, such as the New York State
legislature, to change its ways.336 When lawmakers were confronted
with real victims' stories, they realized the inequity of applying
arbitrary rules that produced inequitable results in real-life situations.
B. How Can Change Be Measured?
Part I.C. discussed the changes in the treatment of same-sex couples
stemming from September 11, 2001. Part II.A. defined storytelling
and discussed how storytelling has been used by gays and lesbians to
both build internal community and persuade and inspire those outside
of their community to understand the legal problems they face. This
section explores the question of how to measure the changes in
treatment of same-sex couples after September 11, 2001. Because the
legislation will be criticized as a one-time sympathetic act that does
not signify any true fundamental change, legal scholars must attempt
to understand whether the change really is fundamental and
potentially long-lasting. Sociologists have explored this question and
provided some insights.
How, for example, can scholars determine the extent of change and
establish a causal relationship between potential factors and
subsequent effects? Did the change stem from one particular factor,
such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or an aggregate of
existing factors, including pre-September 11, 2001 gay rights victories
in New York?337 In other words, was the legislative response to
September 11, 2001 one additional victory in a slow-moving line of
victories? Or does it somehow stand apart and represent a more
substantial victory than those smaller victories that came before it?
This inquiry is more difficult to undertake without the benefit of
knowing the long-term consequences of the legislation in question.3 38
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Worth, supra note 1.
335. See id.
336. See supra Part I.C.2.
337. See e.g., supra Part I.B.3.
338. See Joel F. Handler, Social Movements and the Legal System: A Theory of
Law Reform and Social Change 36 (1978) ("Defining and measuring outcomes is
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Indeed, this Comment can only forecast the legislation's future effects.
Determining how social change is born, evolves, and how it can be
analyzed, is a subject that social scientists have explored before in
various contexts. Generally, social science literature addressing social
change has bled into legal scholarship; in fact, there has been a call by
legal scholars to utilize such literature to supplement legal
scholarship.33 9
In sum, social scientists have found that identifying and measuring

change

is

problematic.

One

commentator

notes that "the

measurement of change and its causal attribution present considerable
34
methodological problems.""
A wealth of literature dedicated to

defining success approaches the problem in a number of ways, often
focusing on particular social movements and their effects on the law.34'
One text providing a framework to measure change is particularly
applicable to post-September 11, 2001 lawmaking.34 2

1. Defining Success: "New Advantages" and "Acceptance"
William Gamson's The Strategy of Social Protest provides a good
starting point for this inquiry.343 Professor Gamson studied fifty-three
social movements and protest groups, 3" "challenging groups," 3 5 who
between 1800 and 1945 "challenged some aspect of the status quo. 34 6
His study analyzed each group's "target of influence," or the person
or institution whose decisions or policies the challenging group sought
further complicated ... [where the subjects are] contemporary organizations .... In
most cases, outcomes will have to be in the nature of a forecast and the theory will not
be able to be validated."); Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts
for Policy Change: The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 421,
432 (1999) ("An additional problem arises in the case of ongoing social movements:
how successful the movement appears depends on at what point in the movement's
trajectory (unknowable, except in retrospect) success is measured.").
339. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 63 (2001) ("There is much to learn from
social movements literature."). In addition to its application to other legal fields,
Professor Rubin argues that social movement literature can shed new light on the
"legal status of women ... [as well as] the labor movement, the civil rights movement,
the gay rights movement, and the children's rights movement." Id. at 79.
340. Nathanson, supra note 338, at 431.
341. See, e.g., William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest 28, 28-37 (1975)
("Success is an elusive idea."); Handler, supra note 338, at 34, 34-41 ("Defining
organizational success is a difficult problem."); Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy,
The Dynamics of Social Movements 190 (1979) ("A particularly knotty problem in
the study of social movements is how to assess their impact.").
342. See generally Gamson, supra note 341.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 19-22.
345. Id. at 14-18.
346. Id. at ix. The challenging groups represented a broad array of social
movements and included the National Urban League, the American Birth Control
League, the American Labor Union, the American Federation of Teachers, and the
Communist Labor Party. Id. app. A, at 145-53.
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to modify; the "target of mobilization," or the "group's constituency"
or other individuals whom the group used to seek its change; and the
"target of benefits," or the beneficiaries of the changes being
sought.347 The study employed a set series of criteria applied to each
group 348 to determine
its "success," which, admittedly, he recognized
349
as "an elusive idea.
Gamson defined success as a set of outcomes: "one concerned with
the fate of the challenging group as an organization and one with the
distribution of new advantages to the group's beneficiary. ' 350 The
former refers to whether the target of influence, or "antagonist,"
accepts the challenging group in some manner "as a valid spokesman
for a legitimate set of interests. ' 35 1 The latter refers to a more tangible
advantage gained by the group's beneficiaries.352 The response to
both questions produces four possible outcomes ranging from
"collapse," or achievement of neither, to "full response," or
achievement of both.3 Because he had the benefit of hindsighttracking the entire arc of a challenging group's rebellion-Professor
Gamson's analysis measured outcomes at the end of the challenge.
As already noted, this Comment's analysis does not have this benefit
because the changes sought after September 11, 2001 are part of the
greater ongoing challenge for same-sex couple rights.354
While
Gamson's approach is a good starting point, one commentator has
observed that, beyond Professor Gamson's two-dimensional
approach, "there is little consensus" on how to define success.
There are other methodologies, though, which lend credence to the
validity of Gamson's approach. One similar dichotomous approach
splits the types of success between "symbolic rewards" and "tangible
347. Id. at 14-16.
348. Id. at 24-27. The questionnaire was comprehensive. It included a group of
questions that sought to determine how the challenging group interacted with "the
law enforcement system, government agencies, mass media, political parties,
legislative bodies, and private interest groups." Id. at 25. The survey further analyzed
the challenging groups' internal characteristics, such as "its leadership, organizational
structure, resources, tactics, [and] ideology." Id. It further evaluated the attributes of
each challenging group's constituency and their relationship to the greater challenging
group. Id. app. C, at 172-75.
349. Id. at 28.
350. Id.

351. Id.
352. Id. at 28-29. The example of a "new advantage" that Professor Gamson then
provides-which is particularly apropos for this inquiry-is "the passage of the
legislation that [the group] desired." Id. at 29.
353. Id. The intermediary levels are "preemption" and "co-optation." Id.
354. Alternatively, if one views the post-September 11, 2001 advocacy for same-sex
couples as a discrete event, it can be viewed as achieving "full response," in that "new
advantages" were gained through the resulting legislation. See supra Part I.C.
Moreover, "acceptance" was also achieved as evidenced implicitly by passage of the
legislation and explicitly by the commentary accompanying it. See supra notes 222,
231.
355. Nathanson, supra note 338, at 431.
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rewards," such as goods and services.356 Tangible rewards can consist
of: "tangible benefits such as better health, education, and welfare
programs .... For consumer groups, tangible benefits would mean
safer and more economical products ... for minorities, the enjoyment
'
of civil rights, jobs, and so forth."357
Under this framework, tangible

rewards are the analog of new advantages in the Gamson schema.
2. The Role of Political Opportunities
Sociologists have also argued that discrete political opportunities,
rather than more "persistent social or economic factors," have the
potential to produce greater social change.358 Such opportunities are
defined broadly to include longer-lasting events, such as booming
economies.3 5 9 For example, it has been argued that the anti-war

movement and other social movements of the 1960s relied on antimaterial ideologies that were triggered by the United States' rising
affluence.36
Similarly, labor strikes are more likely in robust
economies than in depressive ones because higher
demand for
3 61
workers gives them more leverage and political clout.
More dramatic events also spur change: "major new policies of
government come about through broad changes in public opinion
usually caused by dramatic events (wars, depressions, etc.),
extraordinary leadership, or the accumulation of ideas filtered
through the media. 3 62 Under this viewpoint, a social reform group's
role is more limited; it can "put[] ideas on the national agenda, but
organizations cannot bring about such change on their own."3 63

Professor Gamson hypothesized that external crises, such as "a
foreign war or natural disaster," should empower challenging groups
because their targets in the political system are less equipped to turn
back the challenge. 3' His theory was essentially an economic one:
the crisis results in the State having fewer resources to allocate to
"control a challenging group if necessary. 3 65 Applying his theory to
the sample of 53 challenging groups, he found that "challenging
groups that began their challenge in quiet times... do neither better
nor worse than their brethren [who begin] in turbulent times. ' 366
356. See Handler, supra note 338, at 36-37.
357. Id. at 36.
358. See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious
Politics 71 (2d ed. 1998).
359. Id. at 72-73.
360. See id. at 77.
361. Id. at 72-73.
362. Handler, supra note 338, at 39.
363. Id.
364. See Gamson, supra note 341, at 111.
365. Id. ("It frequently becomes more convenient to yield than to divert precious
resources from an already strained system for purposes of social control.").
366. Id. at 112.
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However, Gamson then analyzed the success of social movements
already begun prior to a crisis and found that "crisis is an aid to those
challengers who have already launched their effort and have sustained

it, although without results, up to the time of the crisis. "367
While scholars may debate whether the movement for same-sex
relationship recognition has been entirely "without results" prior to
September 11, 2001, the post-September 11th results are certainly

significant relative to prior results. The resulting conclusion is that
where the challenge is not part of the crisis itself, as is the case here

because the fight for same-sex relationship recognition was not born
on September 11th, government is forced to manage other, more
pressing challenges. 3" The result is a normalization between the
antagonist and the challenging group, and a postponement of
demands in exchange for the promise of future advantage.369 One

September 11th-related example of an ongoing challenge affected by
the terrorist attacks is the argument that foreign policy and criminal
3 70
law changed dramatically with the ensuing war on terrorism.

Specifically, shifts in foreign policy and criminal

law "while

momentous, w[ere] not entirely sudden"37' 1 and that the seeds for such
changes were planted in responses to the 1993 World Trade Center

bombing and the 1998 American Embassy bombing in Africa.372 The

political opportunities doctrine has been used in many contexts; one
analogue to September 11, 2001 provides additional support that the
legislative response to September 11, 2001 is not unfounded, and that
its effects may, in hindsight, prove to be considerable.
3. Analogue
A brief discussion of one other social movement provides an
effective way to look at the application of the social science literature
and begin to hypothesize about the application of the post-September
11, 2001 laws. The anti-smoking movement and its effects on

367. Id. at 114.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See Comment, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115
Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (2002). The author argues that our foreign policy "substantially
changed in the aftermath of the attacks [with] [t]he so-called 'Bush Doctrine'-which
treats states that harbor terrorists on par with the terrorists themselves." Id. at 1227.
Furthermore, the policy transformed our criminal justice system because it was not
used: "[T]he response to September 11 has, thus far, taken place largely outside the
criminal justice system.... Whatever form of justice is at work here, it is not the
traditional form of criminal justice the United States has [previously] applied in
addressing terrorism." Id. at 1226-27.
371. Id. at 1228.
372. Id. at 1228-29. The author argues that, while the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks
sets it apart, the "elements of the current response can be found in past responses, but
they did not coalesce into a coherent doctrine until September 11." Id. at 1228.
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policymaking highlight the importance of political opportunities.373
One author argues that there had been no grassroots anti-smoking
movement before 1964 when the Surgeon General issued a report
exposing the dangers of smoking. The report "was the opportunity
that threw a monkey wrench into this system by creating openings for
dissident individual members of Congress [and] federal agencies
unconnected with the tobacco subsystem. 3 74 The report clearly
became a political opportunity.
Thereafter, federal agencies, benefiting from their independence
from the targets of challenge, e.g., Congress,375 began anti-smoking
initiatives, including the requirement imposed on tobacco companies
to include package warnings.376 A parallel in New York is the New
York State workers' compensation3 77 and crime victims boards,3 78 and
Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master of the FVCF.37 9 While not
regulatory agencies, they maintain more autonomy than legislatures
and, consequently, play important roles to the same-sex partners of
September 11, 2001. Their decision making with respect to same-sex
couples can provide at least symbolic precedent for future
policymaking and, while their hands are tied to a degree by statute,
each has significant latitude in determining whether a same-sex
relationship is eligible for its respective payment.8
4. Disaster Relief
Congress has shown "an increasing willingness to deal with personal
injury claims when there is a 'disaster.""'38 The most immediate
example is Congress's passage of the Air Transportation Safety and
Stabilization Act, and its Federal Victims Compensation Fund, in
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 2 Federal
legislation following disasters has, of course, not been limited to the
issue of personal injury claims.38 3 The nature of such post-disaster
legislation has been examined before and is beneficial to this postSeptember 11, 2001 legislation inquiry.
373. See Nathanson, supra note 338, at 466-75.
374. Id. at 467.
375. Id. at 467-68.
376. Id. at 425.
377. See supra Part I.C.2.d.
378. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
379. See supra Part I.C.l.a.
380. See supra Parts I.C.2.a. (Crime Victims Board), I.C.2.d. (Workers'
Compensation), I.C.L.a. (FVCF).
381. Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1265,1292 (2002).
382. See supra Part I.C.l.a.
383. See, e.g., Jay Schoenfarber, Comment, Capitalizing on Environmental
Disasters: Efficient Utilization of Green Capital, 9 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 147 (1995). For
instance, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was passed in response to the Exxon Valdez
spill. Id. at 150-53.
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a. Post-DisasterRelief Depends on Blameworthiness and Uniqueness
One commentator has argued that, beginning in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, the federal government has traditionally
awarded post-disaster relief based on an individual's ability to present
a narrative of moral blamelessness and fate.384 She argues that the
government differentiated between victims of self-imposed poverty
and victims of disasters that could not have been anticipated. So, the
unemployed were looked upon as lazy and unworthy of relief whereas
victims of earthquakes or floods were viewed as morally blameless.385
According to Landis, the distinction could be difficult to make, as
exemplified by cases where the government viewed victims of
American Indian attacks as responsible for their fate because they
physically placed themselves in vulnerable positions by living near the
American Indians.386 She further argues that "[t]he concern most
often articulated by members of Congress
in opposition to granting
'387
relief was fear of setting a precedent.
One commentator has argued that governmental relief is more
likely for "unique" disasters.38 8 More specifically, it is difficult to
rationalize governmental compensation for a single victim in a
discrete accident, but it is more plausible to offer relief to a larger set
of unique victims.389 The uniqueness, he argues, is less threatening to
taxpayers who won't anticipate paying out again in the future.390
Recurring disasters, such as crop failures or floods, do not evoke the
same degree of sympathy because victims can plan, primarily through
insurance, for future calamities.39
b. Criticisms of Post-DisasterRelief
Economic theorists have argued that constituents often demand,
and lawmakers acquiesce in creating, legislation based on "their
judgments about the probabilities associated with certain harmful
'
activities."392
They argue that individuals often misforecast the risk to
be regulated based on their subjective idea of the harm's

384. Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried by Fire"': DisasterRelief and
the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 967, 988-98
(1998).
385. Id. at 978-81.
386. Id. at 1018.
387. Id. at 998.
388. Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: DisasterRelief and Its Prevention, 3 U.
Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 3-6 (1996).
389. Id. at 4-6.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan.
L. Rev. 1471, 1518 (1998).
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availability.33 One area where this is prevalent is in the context of
environmental legislation, where the miscalculation of harm
"encourages the well-known 'pollutant of the month' syndrome,
where regulation is driven by recent and memorable instances of
'
harm."394
Two important factors in the perception of the availability
of an environmental harm are "the observed frequency of the hazard
and its salience."3'95 Analogizing to September 11, 2001, the frequency
element is not present, but the salience is undeniably high.
One law that was highly criticized because of this misforecasting
was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),3 96 or "Superfund," a federal law
designed to regulate hazardous waste sites397 which was passed
primarily in reaction to the waste site located at Love Canal, New
York. 398 21,000 tons of chemical waste made its way into the canal via
the site between 1943 and 1952, thereby increasing serious health
risks, including cancer. 399 As a result, it received tremendous media
coverage and national attention. However, the criticism emphasizes
that any serious health risk remains unproven, but that because it was
"played up and dramatized by the media and other actors, [it]
produce[d] a legislative response.""
Professor Cass Sunstein criticized the Superfund and has further
argued that "[a] good deal of legislation and regulation can be
explained partly by reference to probability neglect when emotions
are running high." '' He defines "probability neglect" as a person's
instinct to focus on a potentially adverse outcome, and not its low
probability of occurrence, when intense emotions are engaged. One
example he uses is the high degree of concern over flying post-

393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 1519.

396. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
397. See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and
Policy 288 (2d ed. 1996).
398. See Jolls et al., supra note 392, at 1521.
399. See generally N.Y. State Office of Pub. Health, N.Y. State Dep't of Health,
Love Canal: A Special Report to the Governor & Legislature (1981) (reporting on
the post-Love Canal toxicological investigation, relocation of residents from the site,
subsequent litigation and orders issued by the New York State Health Department);
N.Y. State Office of Pub. Health & Governor's Love Canal Inter-Agency Task Force,
Love Canal: Public Health Time Bomb, A Special Report to the Governor and
Legislature (1978) (reporting on the results of environmental and epidemiological
testing at Love Canal); Adeline Gordon Levine, Love Canal: Science, Politics, and
People (1982) (providing a comprehensive overview of the history of Love Canal);
Symposium, The 20th Anniversary of Love Canal: Lessons Learned, 8 Buff. Envtl.
L.J. 171 (2001) (reflecting on Love Canal's long term effects on science and health
research, public policy, industrial policy and environmental social movements).
400. Jolls et al., supra note 392, at 1522.
401. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112
Yale L.J. 61, 98 (2002).
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September 11, 2001 where such fears, which greatly supersede the
actual probability of similar disaster, impose great costs.40 2 While
probability neglect probably does not extend to the post-September
11, 2001 legislation because it is not geared to mitigate the risk of
similar disaster in the future, the contention that interest groups often
exploit disasters to create new legislation has been seen in the remarks
of Louis Sheldon and others, 40 3 and supports their hope that the
change is one-time only.
Similarly, another commentator has argued that people tend to
underestimate a relatively high-probability risk or to overestimate a
relatively low-probability risk.'
Consequently, interest groups and
politicians prey on constituents' fears by legitimizing legislation that
addresses a risk that will most likely not occur again. He states, by
example, that in the financial services industry regulations that follow
disasters bear no relation to the remedy needed to respond to the
disaster; instead, the legislation usually is intended to satisfy a narrow
interest group. 4 5 Additionally, he argues that "[alnother captivating
insight from the literature on social psychology is that people appear
to have a fairly strong sense of innate fairness."4 °6 Applied here, the
post-September 11, 2001 legislation may reflect our legislators' idea of
what is fair.
III. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 CATALYZED A LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX COUPLES THAT IS SUGGESTIVE OF FUTURE
RECOGNITION

The United States has experienced other tragedies, including
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.4 7
Further, domestic partnership
advocates and gay rights activists in general have been faced with
other events in the past that directly affected gays, lesbians and their
families, often with extraordinary responses4°8 and others with little or
no response at all.4"9 However, the changes after September 11, 2001
402. Id. at 100.
403. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
404. Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and ConstitutionalTheory,
87 Cornell L. Rev. 280, 299-301 (2002).
405. Id. at 300.
406. Id. at 301.
407. See generally Brent L. Smith, Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe
Dreams 17-30 (1994).
408. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.3.a.
409. For example, after the brutal murder of Mathew Shepard there was a great
push for federal hate crime legislation that includes hate crimes based on sexual
orientation. See generally Christopher Chorba, Note, The Dangerof FederalizingHate
Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and the Unintended Consequences of the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 319 (2001). Federal legislation was never
passed, and on the fifth year anniversary of Shepard's murder, the Local Law
Enforcement Enhancement Act, which would allow for prosecution of hate crimes
based on sexual orientation, is pending in Congress. See Press Release, The Human
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depart from precedent. Part II.A. discussed the role of storytelling in
legal scholarship and how the voicing of personal narratives has
played a large role in persuading third parties to understand the kinds
of injustices same-sex couples face, and to further persuade them that
these inequities must be changed.41 ° September 11, 2001 played such a
role. The attacks exposed stories of committed couples that lived lives
together just like married heterosexual couples. 4 ' The problems
these couples faced in the wake of the tragedy amount to the same
problems faced by married couples. 4 12 The only difference is that for
the former, remedies were nonexistent. 413 These stories brought a
human element to the arguments traditionally made in seeking equal
treatment under the law. 414 In New York, lawmakers responded.

5

Part II.B. discussed frameworks employed by social scientists to
evaluate social change and how social change can be spurred by
certain unique events, such as disasters. The storytelling scholarship
and frameworks introduced in Part II are used in this part to analyze
the legislative events following September 11, 2001.416
They
demonstrate that September 11, 2001 told a powerful story that had
not been told before. That story resulted in legislation marking a
significant change in the perception and treatment of same-sex
couples. These changes are likely to become more than a minor
victory, and will hopefully lead to additional victories in the future.
Subsequent developments since September 11, 2001 support this
argument.
A. Storytelling and Social Change
The social change literature and storytelling scholarship introduced
in Part II provide an instructive lens through which to view the postSeptember 11, 2001 legislation in question.4 7 The social change
literature sets the framework:
Under Gamson's framework,
challenging groups are those that are trying to challenge the status
quo.4 18 They seek "new advantages" for their beneficiaries. 419 The
Rights Campaign Foundation, HRC Urges Congress to Pass Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act on 5th Anniversary of Mathew Shepard's Death (Oct. 14, 2003), at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Local-LawEnforcementEnhancement
Act&CONTENTID=10564&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cf
m.
410. See supra Part II.A.
411. See, e.g., Worth, supra note 1.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. See generally supra Part II.A. (discussing storytelling's ability to expose a
human element to legal argument).
415. See supra Part I.C.2.
416. See supra Part I.C.
417. While this Comment cannot undertake Gamson's full analysis, I believe a
cursory application is fruitful.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 345-46.
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challenging group clearly consists of those gay rights' organizationsmost prevalently Lambda Legal and the ESPA-who sought both
"new advantages," i.e., legislation, and general "acceptance" from
New York lawmakers for their constituency, the same-sex partners of
victims of September 11, 2001.420 Targets of influence are those
individuals, groups, or institutions being challenged.42 The "target of
influence" is the set of lawmakers, state and federal, targeted by the
challenging group, and the beneficiaries are the same-sex partners of
victims. While "acceptance" appears to be more conceptual and, thus,
the more difficult component to measure, Professor Gamson states
that it involves "a change from hostility or indifference to a more
positive relationship. 4 2 2
Surely Governor Pataki's comments
recognizing all victims of September 11, 2001, which ring of inclusion
and acceptance, 423 qualify as a movement from indifference to a more
accepting relationship. Arguably, the reactions of individuals like
Rev. Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Louis Sheldon that followed
September 11, 2001424 signify a greater "hostility or indifference"
toward the same-sex partners of victims.
Surely, though, the
legislation speaks louder than the antagonistic remarks of the few.425
Further, Jerry Falwell retracted his remarks.42 6 The other component,
"new advantages," which were won are clear: the series of laws and
Executive Orders treating same-sex couples equally to married
couples.427
A "tangible reward" is another term, analogous to Gamson's "new
advantage," that is used to define the concrete benefits that a
challenging group can win. 428 Under the post-September 11, 2001
legislation in New York State, tangible rewards consist of the workers'
compensation benefits, crime victims' awards, and payouts under the
FVCF. The theory clarifies that the "success" of the award of such
goods and services is not realized upon passage of the legislation;
rather, "success" comes when the goods and services are actually
redeemed. Those who do not collect (for whatever reason) are

419. See supra text accompanying note 350.
420. For examples of both groups' involvement, see, for example, supra notes 178,
197, 206, 222 and accompanying text. Further evidence of the importance of
September 11, 2001 to same-sex couples, and the importance of the Lambda Legal
Defense Fund's role, is evidenced by its website: "September 11" is one of the 19
listed "Issues" affecting gays and lesbians. Lambda Legal Defense Fund, Issues, at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
421. See text accompanying supra note 347.
422. Gamson, supra note 341, at 31.
423. See supra note 222.
424. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 262.
426. See supra note 267.
427. See supra Part I.C.
428. See Handler, supra note 338, at 36.
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examples of failure.4 29 Consequently, only the beneficiaries can
subvert the law's "success."
Symbolic rewards, likened to Gamson's "acceptance," can be just as
important as goods and services because they have the potential to act
as more enduring victories.43 ° While the tangible rewards granted
through the New York State legislation are undeniably substantial,
there can be further reaching symbolic rewards because "[s]ometimes
the law sharpens perceptions and acts as an educator or moral
persuader."4 3 The legislation's potential to act as an "educator or
moral persuader" is twofold: it can educate the citizenry about samesex couples' difficulties, inducing them to help, and it can further
educate lawmakers and policymakers that the sky will not fall
if same43 2
sex couples are recognized as equal to opposite-sex couples.
The law's ability to act as a moral persuader and educator is
supported by storytelling's message that personal narrative has a
persuasive function that provides "informational value" to the
ignorant. 3 In the present context, the most basic information that
September 11, 2001 imparted on the citizenry is that same-sex couples
are real couples that inhabit the same cities, towns, and workplaces as
heterosexual couples.
While this may seem obvious to some,
advocates of storytelling emphasize that ingroups' narratives
dominate our thinking to the extent that outgroups' voices are simply
not heard.4 34 Some may willfully ignore the needs of same-sex couples
while others may acquiesce with the ingroup's narrative and assume
everyone is fairly governed by our law.
September 11, 2001, then, told a number of stories that informed
the public, and propelled lawmakers to act humanely. One story is
that many same-sex couples live monogamous, marriage-type lives
that are indistinguishable from couples who actually are allowed to
marry. Indeed, the legislative support for the September 11th Victims
and Families Relief Act recognized the need for relief to all
"committed couples," not just those that were married.4 35 National
news media picked up on these stories and brought them to citizens
who, without a tragedy such as September 11, 2001, may not have
heard them.436 Such stories fly in the face of the traditional narrative
429. Id. at 37.
430. See id.
431. Id.
432. One historian argues that in cities it is difficult for a disaster to significantly
alter deeply entrenched societal patterns. However, she argues that disasters provide
opportunities for a government and its citizenry to honestly evaluate how they
responded to "social obligations and .. .social needs-in ordinary times." Karen
Sawislak, September 11 and New York City: Patternsof Urban Disaster in the United
States, 34 Urb. Law. 599, 607 (2002).
433. See supra Part II.A.
434. See supra Part II.A.
435. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
436. For example, Larry Courtney's story was reported by the New York Times and
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that gays and lesbians are over-sexualized beings incapable of
marrying and parenting. 437 The fact that such stories focused on
couples and family lives, rather than sexual conduct, may be a reason
why lawmakers were willing to extend certain rights and privileges.
Ingroup members were exposed to couples who led lives parallel to
their own -the kind of lives that have financial concerns, like whether
a partner will be compensated in the event he or she is injured or
killed on the job. 438 These stories allowed ingroup members to
analogize their own lives to those of the affected same-sex couples.
Once people understood that same-sex couples do in fact exist, a
narrative of gay invisibility under the law surfaced. Larry Courtney's
inaccessibility to workers' compensation payments appeared patently
unjust, given the length and nature of his relationship with his
deceased partner.43 9 It is likely that lawmakers understood this, at
least to a greater extent than they had before. The rationale is that
when people can empathize with another's problem, they are more
likely to respond as if they were facing the problem themselves. 440
The storyteller's goal is to convince the listener that he or she could
have been the same victim. Generally, stories create empathy by
convincing the listener that he or she is like the subject of the story in
some significant way-often through a shared experience of a
powerful emotion or an important event. 41 Surely, September 11,
2001 served this purpose because those unaffected by the tragedy
directly realized how they very easily could have been affected. The
survivors' stories rang of commonality. As storytelling scholarship
teaches, persuasive narratives such as these involve highlighting
similarities and de-emphasizing difference." 2
Advocates of storytelling argue that the human side of a narrative
plays a strong part in determining the persuasiveness of an argument.
It is clear that September 11, 2001 brought to light many stories, all of
them human and compelling. 443 These stories surely impacted the
public, including lawmakers. However, questions remain as to the
degree of influence the stories had. Lawmakers were certainly
influenced to a degree. For example, both Governor Pataki himself
and the New York State Crime Victims Board invoked the need to
other news outlets. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Mark Bingham, one of
the passengers on United Airlines Flight 93 who attacked the hijackers, thereby
avoiding a collision in Washington D.C., was widely celebrated as a hero in an article
in the New York Times. Nieves, supra note 260. The Advocate named him person of
the year, and he was eulogized by Senator John McCain. Id.
437. See supra Part 11.A.2.

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

See the discussion of workers' compensation in New York, supra Part I.C.2.d.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See Fajer, supra note 275, at 521.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 523.

443. See, e.g., Worth, supra note 1.
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recognize "committed relationships" when they took the steps they
did after September 11, 2001. 44 Because gay rights advocates had
been telling similar stories in the past," 5 many will argue that
lawmakers did not suddenly become empathetic. Instead, some will
argue that the lawmaking that occurred constitutes a political
concession that does not represent any real change in treatment. The
next section deals with these questions of causation and goes on to
discuss the likelihood of future victories.
B. Causation, the Use of PoliticalOpportunities,and the Potential
Effects of Post-September11, 2001 Legislation
Because the legislation is designed to compensate the same-sex
partners of victims of September 11, 2001, it is logically a response to
that day's terrorist attacks. However, the post-September 11, 2001
challenge that spurred the legislation did not occur in a vacuum; the
fight for same-sex relationship recognition began in the decades
preceding September 11, 2001 and, thus, set the stage for these
victories." 6 Consequently, a question remains as to what role the
ongoing factors preceding September 11, 2001 played and how they
interacted with the terrorist attacks to spur the legislation.
While the determination of causal relationships is difficult, it is clear
that multiple factors can play a role. Potential factors have been
defined as "inputs from the social environment in the form of
demands of conflicting interests affected by social change seeking
recognition."" 7 Here, the set of social environment inputs preceding
September 11, 2001 is large and includes, for example, the consistent
judicial and legislative challenges explored in Parts I.A. and I.B. The
primary social input following the attacks was the advocacy of gay and
lesbian rights groups such as the ESPA and Lambda Legal. With
respect to the passage of the amendment of the New York State
Workers' Compensation Law, the primary input was a request made
to New York State Assemblymember Catherine Nolan from a
constituent who lost a same-sex partner. 448 That request acted as a
stimulus to Assemblymember Nolan to introduce and sponsor the law.
The inputs are then "converted" into output through "the interactive
and decisional behavior of the policy-making actors in the system, e.g.,

444. See supra notes 222 (Pataki), 224 (CVB).
445. For example, arguments made in the Braschi trial focused on the commitment
of same-sex couples. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
446. See generally supra Parts I.A.-B.
447. C. Thomas Dienes, Judges, Legislators, and Social Change, in Law and Social
Change 33-34 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1970) (citations omitted).
448. In a conversation with Assemblymember Catherine Nolan's legislative
counsel, she indicated that Chapter 467 was spurred by this constituent's request.
Telephone Interview with Gerry Reilly, Counsel, Assemblymember Catherine Nolan
(Nov. 21, 2002).
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legislature and judiciary."" 9 The study of social movements shows us
that when multiple inputs are present, triggering events, such as
political opportunities can act to catalyze them to greater change.45 ° It
is clear that the challenging group had already launched its challenge
prior to September 11, 2001.451 The ongoing advocacy of groups such
as Lambda Legal and ESPA set the stage for responding to an
external event, September 11, 2001.
Nonetheless, many will argue that while the desire to compensate
victims of September 11, 2001 did indeed catalyze a change in
treatment of same-sex couples, the change was minimal. Indeed, the
laws only compensate a small group of survivors of victims of a
discrete event, so its immediate effect does not reach that far.452
Others will also argue that any other reaction by legislators would
have been political suicide. In the wake of such a tragedy, legislators
had no other option but to act as they did. This argument, though,
ignores the fact that past events, which could have spurred serious
change, did not. For example, the murder of Mathew Shepard, which
received national attention, has not led to federal hate crimes
legislation, notwithstanding a strong push to have such legislation
passed.4 53 While it's difficult to "compare" one tragedy to another,
September 11, 2001 differs in the number of people affected and its
impact on the American psyche. September 11, 2001 also differs in
that it affected both heterosexual and same-sex couples at the same
time. People can identify more easily with September 11, 2001
because they could have been affected, whereas, sadly, many who are
not gay feel little connection to the victim of a hate crime based on
because it
sexual orientation. September 11, 2001 is therefore unique
454
spurred a common empathy-one that "can forge bonds.
The nature and "uniqueness" of the September 11, 2001 attacks also
sets it apart from prior events and helps explain why the narratives
Storytelling scholarship
that followed were so effective.455
demonstrates that the effectiveness of a legal argument often times
lies in the narrative that the speaker presents.4 56 Individuals used the
uniquely human elements of September 11, 2001 to tell particularly
compelling stories about same-sex couples. Specifically, these stories
evoked sympathy for those who did not, or could not, plan for the
attacks. This narrative of blamelessness conflicts with the traditional
narrative that gays and lesbians deserve any inequity they face
449. Dienes, supra note 447, at 34.
450. See supra Part II.B.2.
451. See generally Parts I.A.-B.
452. This excludes the Crime Victims' Board amendment, which will now include
same-sex partners in all future awards. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
453. See supra note 409.
454. See Fajer, supra note 275, at 521.
455. See supra Part II.B.4.a.
456. See supra Part II.A.

2886

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

because they have chosen their sexuality.4 5 7 While the survivors of
same-sex partners were invisible under the law because they "chose"
their relationship, they did not choose to lose a partner any legal
recognition from the state. Some may argue that their plight still
remains a product of choice, but it is a more attenuated result from
"choice," and this makes it easier for lawmakers to accept. In sexual
conduct cases, for instance, courts are more apt to deny relief because
gays and lesbians are viewed as willfully choosing to engage in sexual
conduct. In contrast, while victims of the attacks "chose" their
relationships years prior, they did not choose, nor could they have
planned for, a terrorist attack. This allowed people to view the
victims, including gay victims, as morally blameless for the attacks.
Through this lens, then, while certain victims chose their partners,
they did not choose the attacks and its consequences, and did not
choose to be denied spousal-type benefits. While causation in this
context is difficult to prove, the salience of the World Trade Center
attacks and the personal narratives that followed are strong evidence
that significant change has occurred.
First, New York State's passage of the Sexual Orientation NonDiscrimination Act ("SONDA")4 58 on December 17, 2002 happened a
little more than one year after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In
passing SONDA, New York became the thirteenth state to outlaw
discrimination based on sexual orientation, which now applies to
housing, employment, public accommodation, education, and credit.
Of particular interest, the bill was originally introduced in 1971; it was
suddenly passed after thirty-one years of consistent lobbying and
advocacy. Gay rights groups' pointed to legislators' post-September
11, 2001 actions as an impetus for the subsequent passage of
SONDA.4 59
In April, 2003, the New York Supreme Court, Nassau County, held
that the same-sex survivor of a deceased spouse, whose underlying
relationship had been solemnized under Vermont's civil union statute,
had standing to bring a wrongful death claim against the hospital in
which he died.4"
The Court fashioned its decision in part by
analogizing the dispute to prior New York state cases, such as
Braschi,41 where a statutory right previously unavailable to same-sex

457. Professor Fajer argues that gay men and lesbians are portrayed as embodying
"sex-as-lifestyle," which supports the notion that this lifestyle is chosen. See Fajer,
supra note 275, at 537-46.
458. 2002 N.Y. Laws 2 (codified at N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(27), 296 (McKinney
Supp. 2004)).
459. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
460. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003). See Part
I.A.3. for a general discussion of a same-sex survivor's historic inability to bring a
wrongful death action.
461. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). For a discussion of Braschi, see Part I.B.3.a.
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couples was extended to them through a court's equity powers. 462 In
coming to the result that New York should recognize Vermont's civil
unions for the purpose of wrongful death actions, the Court noted the
rights registered New York City domestic partners were entitled to,
including those available to survivors of September 11, 2001.463 More
generally, the Court recognized that New York's treatment of same
sex couples reflects, at least in part, the fact that "public opinion
regarding same-sex unions is evolving. ''4 ' The decision of greatest
importance in this context is Lawrence v. Texas,465 which held a Texas
sodomy law prohibiting certain sexual acts between member of the
same sex to be unconstitutional and, in turn, struck down Bowers v.
4 66
Hardwick.
The significance of the decision for same-sex couples
was heightened by the Court's apologetic and highly respectful tone
toward gay men and lesbians-one arguably unseen in any of its prior
jurisprudence on the subject. 467 While sociologists concede that
projecting the long-term effects of certain events on long-term social
causes is a difficult task and an inexact science,468 the gay rights
victories immediately following September 11, 2001, coupled with
those victories since, appear to represent a significant turn.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Comment has been to explore the perception
and legal treatment of same-sex relationships in New York
specifically, and the United States generally, in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
Same-sex couples were
traditionally ignored in New York in a number of important ways;
however, in the wake of September 11, 2001 that treatment changed
dramatically. This Comment explored the question of why legislators
acted as they did after September 11, 2001 and the potential for future
change. The analysis shows that dramatic events can serve as catalysts
for social reform. Similarly, the use of storytelling to advance rarely
heard perspectives is a device that outgroups have traditionally used.
462. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
463. Id. at 416.
464. Id. at 420. The Court went on to state: "[I]t
is impossible to justify, under
equal protection principles, withholding the same recognition from a union which
meets all the requirements of a marriage in New York but for the sexual orientation
of its partners." Id. at 420-21.
465. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
466. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
467. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484 ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime."). Fearing that the ruling will open up
the door to a judicial grant of same-sex marriage, conservatives have come together to
propose a constitutional amendment defining marriage as a relationship solely
between a man and a woman. See Alan Cooperman, Sodomy Ruling Fuels Battle over
Gay Marriage,Wash. Post, July 31, 2003, at Al.
468. See supra text accompanying note 340.
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After September 11, 2001, the same-sex survivors of victims told
compelling stories that changed the way others viewed them. While
emotions run high in the wake of disasters, and consequently may
skew legislators' policymaking, resulting policies should not be
dismissed as merely reactive.
Now that New York has broadened its legal recognition of same-sex
couples, it begs the question of whether New York, other state
governments, and the federal government will seek to, or whether it
will even be able to, turn back the clock.469

469. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements
and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419, 453 (2001) ("The effect of the Supreme
Court's decisions is impossible to calibrate exactly, but it surely contributed to mass
mobilization (as well as vice versa).").

